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I.

INTRODUCTION

Outrageousness. Of all the standards employed in tort law (negligence, recklessness, malice, etc.), outrageousness, as part of the tort
of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), is
one of, if not the most difficult to define. Attempts to define the
concept typically involve generally unhelpful platitudes or examples
1
of actions that are not outrageous. The Restatement (Second) of Torts’
explanation that “outrageous” conduct is conduct that would arouse
the resentment of the average member of the community against the
2
defendant “and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” has elicited
chuckles from first-year law students for decades.
Compounding the difficulty is the fact that outrageousness is a
relative concept. Much depends on the context and the relationship
3
between the parties. It is black-letter law, for example, that mere in4
sults do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. But while a
court may have little difficulty applying that rule in the case of an insult or slur uttered by a stranger, a racial insult or slur directed by an
5
employer at an employee might produce a different result. Ultimately, the most recurring criticism of the tort is that its lack of clear
standards with respect to the concept of “extreme and outrageous”

∗
Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. My thanks
to my colleagues Joe King and Paula Schaefer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to Craig Finn and Tad Kubler.
1
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977).
3
See Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(“[O]utrageousness is not only highly subjective it is an extremely mutable trait.”).
4
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1977).
5
See Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 694−95 (N.J. 1998) (concluding that a reasonable juror could find racial slur uttered by a sheriff and directed at subordinate
officer to be outrageous but that a similar slur spoken by a stranger would not qualify).
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conduct—the most important element of the tort —leads to unpre7
dictable results.
Similar line-drawing difficulties emerge in IIED cases involving
lawyers as defendants. It is well established that mere legal malpractice on the part of a lawyer, standing alone, cannot form the basis of
8
an IIED claim. And in general, plaintiffs have had little success with
9
their IIED claims against attorneys. But beyond these general observations, things are often less clear. Clients and non-clients have pursued IIED claims against lawyers for a wide variety of misconduct,
10
ranging from trying to coerce clients into having sex, to overly11
aggressive cross-examination, to threatening criminal prosecution in
12
an attempt to collect a debt. While most IIED claims against attorneys fail, predicting whether a particular attorney’s actions will be determined to have crossed the line into “extreme and outrageous”
conduct is sometimes at least as difficult as it is with respect to other
defendants.
Of course, one can argue that the outcomes of IIED cases involving attorneys are predictable in the sense that most plaintiffs lose.
But there remains the related question of why a finding that a lawyer’s misconduct is not extreme and outrageous should be the norm.
Why, for example, is it that a lawyer’s willful neglect of a client matter
rarely rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, even
when the results of the neglect are foreseeable and/or extreme (e.g.,
13
14
losing custody of one’s child or attempted suicide )? What does it
take for a lawyer’s conduct to be considered extreme and outrageous

6
See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 42, 42–43 (1982) (stating that, in practice, the tort “tends to reduce to a single element—the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct”).
7
See id. at 63 (“When the parties are not bound by contract, the cases are fewer,
the results more unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent.”); Russell Fraker,
Note, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical Analysis of the Problematic Tort of IIED, 61 VAND.
L. REV. 983, 1003 (2008) (noting the tort’s “lack of clear substantive boundaries” and
unpredictability of borderline cases).
8
E.g., Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying Tennessee law); Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp. 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (applying
Virginia law); Caddell v. Gates, 327 S.E.2d 351, 352 (S.C. 1984).
9
1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 6:28, at 742
(2011).
10
See infra Part IV.A.2.
11
See infra notes 221–22 and accompanying text.
12
See infra Part IV.B.3.
13
E.g., Thornton v. Squyres, 877 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ark. 1994).
14
E.g., O’Neil v. Vasseur, 796 P.2d 134, 141 (Idaho 1990).
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for purposes of an IIED claim? As importantly, how can a finder of
fact make this determination in any responsible and consistent manner?
The decisional law involving IIED claims against lawyers provides
little guidance on these questions. IIED cases involving lawyers
present a host of challenging issues. The overall law governing lawyers is replete with references to the special responsibilities lawyers
have with respect to their clients and the legal system. Lawyers are
often under obligations that are in tension with each other, thus
sometimes complicating the analysis of whether a lawyer’s conduct is
extreme and outrageous for purposes of civil liability. For example,
the fact that a lawyer has, in the course of representing a client, violated the ethical duty to refrain from harassing others during the
course of representation might cut in favor of a finding of outra15
geousness. However, the fact that the same lawyer is also under a
duty to diligently and zealously pursue the client’s interests may cut
16
against such a finding.
Unfortunately, courts tend to decide (often as a matter of law)
whether a lawyer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous with little regard for the complexities inherent in these kinds of cases. Indeed, as
they frequently do in IIED cases involving non-lawyers, courts tend to
decide the issue with little reference to any but the most vague of
standards. This is a problem that plagues much of IIED law. But, as
this Article attempts to demonstrate, in the case of IIED claims
against lawyers, the problem is especially pronounced. Therefore,
this Article attempts to provide some clarity by proposing an approach for evaluating lawyer conduct that relies on more objective
indicia of outrageousness.
This Article examines the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as applied to the conduct of lawyers engaging in the
17
practice of law. Part II discusses the basic elements of the tort, with
a particular focus on the factors and objective indicia of extreme and
outrageous conduct that courts have sometimes relied upon in evaluating a defendant’s conduct. In the case of lawyers charged with
15

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2011).
Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
17
Excluded from the discussion are situations in which a lawyer is a defendant
but the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct does not primarily involve the lawyer engaging in the practice of law. See, e.g., Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 696
N.E.2d 953, 954 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (involving a lawyer who allegedly required his
secretary to engage in illegal acts, including forging his wife’s signature); Bevan v.
Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 2002) (involving a claim stemming from a lawyer’s assault on another).
16
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the intentional infliction of emotional distress, one possible indicator
18
of extreme and outrageous conduct is a violation of an ethical rule.
Therefore, Part III explores how these factors and rules might, in
theory, apply in the case of an IIED claim against a lawyer. The Article concludes, however, that sole reliance on these factors and the
ethical rules governing lawyers will often be inadequate. Part IV examines how courts have dealt with IIED claims brought against lawyers by their clients as compared to the IIED claims of non-clients.
Finally, Part V attempts to offer more concrete standards with respect
to what qualifies as extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of a
lawyer. Specifically, this Part argues that in gauging the outrageousness of a lawyer’s conduct, courts should expressly look to the ethical
rules governing lawyers, the policies underlying those rules, and most
importantly, the formal standards for imposing professional discipline against lawyers.
II. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS AND
INDICATORS OF EXTREME AND OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT
The broad contours of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are well established. To recover, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant, by extreme and outrageous conduct, intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to the
19
plaintiff. While formulations of the elements may vary slightly, every
20
jurisdiction recognizes the tort. However, virtually every jurisdiction
also struggles with the concept of extreme and outrageous conduct.
The following Part describes some of the approaches courts have taken with respect to defining what constitutes “extreme and outrageous” conduct, the most crucial element of an IIED claim.
A. Constraints on the Tort
The common-law rules governing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are designed to address tort law’s
longstanding reluctance—based largely on concerns over excessive
18
Resort to professional standards to determine a breach of an applicable standard is hardly uncommon in tort law. For example, physician liability in medical
malpractice cases is determined with reference to objective standards, namely the
professional standards governing physicians. See Joseph H. King, The Common Knowledge Exception to the Expert Testimony Requirement for Establishing the Standard of Care in
Medical Malpractice, 59 ALA. L. REV. 51, 51 (2007).
19
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
20
Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom Biography and Intellectual History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 577, 604 (2010).
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litigation and fraudulent claims—to recognize liability solely for emo21
tional harm, its concerns over allowing tort law to impose liability
22
for mere incivility rather than truly tortious conduct, and the need
23
to preserve doctrinal clarity and distinction between existing torts.
In order to address the concerns over fakery and excessive litigation
stemming from allowing recovery in the absence of physical harm, a
plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress must establish that the defendant’s conduct resulted in severe emotional dis24
tress. To prevent the tort from trampling upon other torts that are
designed to address specific wrongs, numerous jurisdictions view intentional infliction of emotional distress as a “gap-filler” tort that
cannot be used to circumvent the restrictions of another tort that
25
more naturally applies to the defendant’s conduct. But perhaps the
most important limitation on the tort is the requirement that the de26
fendant’s conduct be extreme and outrageous.

21
See Givelber, supra note 6, at 57 (arguing that the tort’s constraints are based,
in part, on the desire “to provide reliable confirmation that the plaintiff’s suffering is
genuine and reasonable”); Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law: Themes of
Constraint, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1198–99 (2009) (discussing tort law’s historical reluctance to permit recovery for stand-alone emotional distress).
22
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“[P]laintiffs must
necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough
language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind.”); Givelber, supra note 6, at 57 (arguing that the tort’s constraints are based, in part, on
the view that “incivility is so pervasive in our society that it is inappropriate for the law
to attempt to provide a remedy for it in every instance”); Rabin, supra note 21, at
1205 (explaining the constraints on IIED by reference to the need to “polic[e] the
boundary between aberrant and acceptable social behavior”).
23
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
45 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (noting that limitations on the tort “are essential in preventing this tort from being so expansive as to intrude on important
countervailing policies”).
24
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); see Fraker, supra note 7, at
1001 (noting that courts have been reluctant to expand liability under the tort due to
concerns over excessive litigation and fraudulent claims).
25
See, e.g., Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex. 2005)
(“[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress is ‘a ‘gap-filler’ tort never intended to
supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies.”); Hoffmann-La
Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004) (stating that the tort was
created “for the limited purpose of allowing recovery in those rare instances in which
a defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in a manner so unusual
that the victim has no other recognized theory of redress”); Fraker, supra note 7, at
996 (noting that “in a significant minority of jurisdictions,” courts have found that
the tort “cannot overlap with other torts or statutory wrongs”).
26
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); Givelber, supra note 6, at 42–
43 (“[The tort] tends to reduce to a single element—the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct.”).
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As suggested in the Introduction, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to state with precision what actions qualify as extreme and outra27
geous. The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided perhaps the most common explanation of the term. Comment d to section 46 of the Restatement explains that “[l]iability has been found
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
28
community.” Emphasizing the idea that liability is only appropriate
in limited circumstances, the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that
“liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats,
29
annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”
The reality, however, is that courts frequently offer little explanation for their conclusions as to why conduct is not sufficiently outrageous to satisfy the tort’s chief requirement. In an observation
noteworthy for its candor, a Florida appellate court summarized the
approach of Florida courts in addressing the outrageousness element:
The appellate courts of Florida have developed an almost “form”
opinion for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims: (1)
brief recitation of the facts; (2) quotation of Restatement comment d; (3) pronouncement that the conduct does not meet the
Restatement test of atrociousness, utter intolerability, passing all
30
bounds of decency and impulsion to exclaim “outrageous!”

Although limited to Florida courts, the court’s observation applies
with equal force to most jurisdictions.
B. Indicators of Outrageousness
Although the question of whether a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous is intensely fact-specific, certain indicators of
outrageousness have developed over time. According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, these indicators include “the relationship of the
parties, whether the actor abused a position of authority over the
other person, whether the other person was especially vulnerable and
the actor knew of the vulnerability, the motivation of the actor, and
27
See Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“Specific rules for when conduct is extreme and outrageous cannot be stated, nor can categories of conduct be identified for formulation into universal rules.”); Givelber, supra note 6, at 42 (noting the “extraordinary
lack of defined standards” regarding what qualifies as outrageous conduct).
28
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
29
Id.
30
Lashley, 561 So. 2d at 409.
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31

whether the conduct was repeated or prolonged.” Regarding the
relationship of the parties, a relationship of trust—such as that of
doctor and patient—may be sufficiently special to establish a lower
32
standard of outrageousness. But even where a relationship of such
heightened trust does not exist, any relationship that tort law treats as
“special” enough to impose a heightened duty on the defendant—
such as innkeeper and guest—may also make it easier for a plaintiff
to establish that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outra33
geous. Similarly, while insults are generally not considered extreme
and outrageous, the existence of a special relationship may lead a
34
court to conclude that the insult is actionable.
Closely related to the idea that a special relationship may help
render conduct extreme and outrageous is the notion that conduct
may be actionable where the defendant holds a position of authority
35
over the plaintiff and abuses that position. This would also include
the situation where the defendant’s position provides the defendant
with actual or apparent authority over the plaintiff, or the power to
36
affect the plaintiff’s interests. Most of the other indicators of extreme and outrageous conduct—such as the defendant’s knowledge
that the plaintiff was especially vulnerable—are easily understood.
31

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007). One author lists four main categories of conduct supporting a finding of outrageous conduct:
(1) [A]busing a position of power; (2) emotionally harming a plaintiff
known to be especially vulnerable; (3) repeating or continuing conduct
that may be tolerable when committed once but becomes intolerable
when committed numerous times; and (4) committing or threatening
violence or serious economic harm to a person or property in which
the plaintiff is known to have a special interest.
John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L.
REV. 789, 803 (2007).
32
See McQuay v. Gunthorp, 986 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Ark. 1999) (taking into account
the trust a patient places in a doctor in assessing outrageousness of defendantdoctor’s conduct).
33
See, e.g., Hubbard v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 1224, 1230 (4th Cir. 1976)
(noting special relationship of shipper and common carrier in concluding that defendant’s conduct could be considered sufficiently extreme and outrageous for purposes of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
34
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965); see also Brown v. Manning, 764 F. Supp. 183, 187 (M.D. Ga. 1991) (concluding that special relationship
between insurer and insured helped render defendant’s obscene statements extreme
and outrageous); Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 n.21 (D.C. 1980) (citing
examples of common carrier, innkeeper, or public utility as situations in which insults may become actionable).
35
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 45
cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
36
Id.
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Although these indicators of outrageousness provide courts with
some guidance, they have not led to predictable outcomes in IIED
cases. The indicators, although simple enough on their face, are subject to any number of countervailing concerns in a given case. For
example, an employer occupies a position of authority over an employee. Thus, at first glance, it would seem that employees alleging
IIED against their employers—either for the fact of their firing or for
the abuse they endured while employed—would have a relatively
37
high success rate. Yet, the opposite is generally true. The employment at-will rule, which, is subject to numerous exceptions, provides
employers with the right to discharge their employees at any time, for
any reason, has largely shielded employers from IIED claims based
38
upon the fact of a firing. And while it is certainly possible that an
employer’s abusive treatment of an employee during an employment
relationship might rise to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior, the at-will employment rule provides courts with a ready response to such claims: the at-will rule is designed to preserve management prerogative, and inherent in that concept is the notion that
management must be given wide latitude in running their workplaces
as they see fit, even if it means foreseeable emotional distress on the
39
part of employees.

37

See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1988) (summarizing case law);
William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 91, 110 (2003) (noting that employees who have sued their employers for
IIED have generally fared poorly); see also Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 417
(Ark. 1996) (taking a “strict view in recognizing a claim for the tort of outrage in
employment-relationship[s]”).
38
See, e.g., Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1987) (“Mere
discharge from employment does not constitute outrageous or intolerable conduct
by an employer.”); Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration From
Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2181 (2007) (“[The tort] is not
intended to change the at-will employment doctrine or interfere with management’s
prerogative to terminate [at-will] employees.”); Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of
the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693,
1697 (1996) (“[A]n at-will employee implicitly submits to being terminated without
notice or cause and so cannot claim that such conduct against him is outrageous.”).
39
See Austin, supra note 37, at 8 (“The courts accord employers wide latitude in
directing their employees’ activities in ways that cause them emotional distress.”);
Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment at Will: The
Case Against the “Tortification” of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387, 422
(1994) (“[T]he goal of such torts, as applied, is to attack the employer’s decision
making . . . .”). One of the most commonly-discussed issues in recent years is the
ability of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims to address the problem of
“workplace bullying,” with many commentators questioning the tort’s effectiveness in
this regard. See Corbett, supra note 37, at 119–22 (discussing the increased attention
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C. Objective Indicia of Outrageous Conduct
The list of indicators provided in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is
not exhaustive. Extortionate conduct, for example, may satisfy the
40
outrageousness requirement. The central problem in defining outrageous conduct, however, is that there are relatively few reliable, ob41
jective indicators of such conduct. In deciding whether a plaintiff’s
case is strong enough to withstand summary judgment, courts must
draw their own conclusions as to whether a defendant’s conduct is
within the bounds of social acceptability. Yet, as Professor Daniel Givelber argued nearly thirty years ago, this is an exceptionally difficult
task. There is no reason to believe that judges are particularly adept
42
at divining the public’s sense of what is socially tolerable. This may
be because judges are not particularly tuned in to prevailing societal
norms of acceptable conduct or because there is disagreement within
43
the community as to what the norm is. Regardless, judges often
have little to go on when deciding whether there is a genuine issue of
fact concerning the issue. Finally, judges may have difficulty in deciding whether a defendant’s conduct is “utterly intolerable in a civilized
community” because there is disagreement on the question between
the community of which the defendant is a member (e.g., the business community or medical profession) and the broader community
44
as a whole.
That said, if one is seeking to determine whether the relevant
community considers a particular act intolerable, there may be at
least some objective indicators that are potentially relevant. For example, the fact that a defendant’s conduct offends some wellestablished and clearly-defined public policy should logically factor
into assessing whether the conduct is so transgressive of community
standards as to be extreme and outrageous. Indeed, as discussed below, some courts have explicitly relied on statements of public policy
in helping to make the outrageousness determination.

being devoted to workplace bullying and the ability of IIED claims to address the
problem).
40
See, e.g., Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
41
See Duffy, supra note 39, at 422 (“[A]nalysis of outrageousness in a given case
depends not on concrete standards . . . but, instead, upon the court’s own response
to what it considers to be particularly egregious facts.”); Givelber, supra note 6, at 56
(noting the lack of “external standards for outrageousness”).
42
Givelber, supra note 6, at 52.
43
Id. at 53.
44
Id.
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The General Role of Public Policy in the
Outrageousness Determination

“Public policy” is a concept almost as elusive as outrageousness.
However, courts have frequently relied on the fact that a defendant’s
actions somehow offended public policy in considering questions of
liability. Where, for example, a court concludes that a contractual
provision offends public policy, the provision may be unenforceable
45
on that basis.
In assessing whether a defendant’s actions offend public policy,
courts typically look to positive expressions of public policy contained
46
in constitutional or statutory provisions. Courts also sometimes look
47
to other sources of public policy, such as administrative regulations.
Others have been willing to conclude that at least some professional
48
standards of conduct may be reliable indicators of public policy.
In the tort context, most courts have been willing to conclude
that public policy may limit an employer’s ability to discharge an employee. The tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
represents an exception to the default rule of employment at-will.
Thus, where an employer’s discharge of an employee threatens substantial public policy—for example, where an employer fires an employee for performing jury duty—the employee may have a remedy in
49
tort.
Similarly, several courts have expressed the idea that conduct
that violates public policy may constitute extreme and outrageous
50
conduct for purposes of an IIED claim. For example, in Macey v.
New York State Electric & Gas Corp., a New York case, the plaintiff al45
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981); Alex B. Long,
Attorney-Client Fee Agreements that Offend Public Policy, 61 S.C. L. REV. 287, 291 (2009).
46
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) cmt. a (1981).
47
Id.
48
See Post v. Bregman, 707 A.2d 806, 818 (Md. 1998) (concluding that Maryland
disciplinary rule governing fee-sharing agreements between lawyers articulates a public policy and refusing to enforce an agreement that violated rule).
49
See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975).
50
Leone v. New England Commc’ns, No. CV010509752S, 2002 WL 1008470
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C.
1984); Macey v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 436 N.Y.S.2d 389, 391-92 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981); see also Sethi v. Yaglidere, No. CV044003034S, 2009 WL 2963283, at
*13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2009) (considering the “strong public policy expressed by statute in our state, dating to colonial times, prohibiting illegal entry and
detainer” in evaluating whether defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous);
Myers v. Hot Bagels Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1076–77 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
(stating that Ohio recognizes two versions of IIED, the second of which is “premised
on public policy”).
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leged that a public utility refused to restore power to the plaintiff un51
til she separated from her husband. There is a longstanding and
well-recognized policy against encouraging the dissolution of mar52
riage. Thus, according to the court, if the plaintiff’s allegations were
true, the defendant’s actions would offend public policy and could
53
also amount to extreme and outrageous conduct.
2.

Statutes as Indicia of Outrageousness

Courts have also sometimes taken into account the fact that a
defendant’s actions violate a statute in deciding whether a jury ques54
tion exists on the outrageousness issue. The fact that a legislature
views a problem as being substantial enough to warrant a legislative
solution provides at least some indication that the defendant’s intentional conduct in violation of the statute is socially intolerable. One
obvious example would be employment discrimination statutes, such
55
as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These statutes “represent
the social judgment that racism in the workplace is a profound social
56
evil.” Thus, for example, in Howard University v. Best, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals pointed to the fact that the defendant’s
repeated instances of sexual harassment violated public policy, as articulated in the D.C. Human Rights Act, in concluding that the defendant’s conduct could be considered extreme and outrageous for
57
purposes of an IIED claim.
51

Macey, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 391–92.
See Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn. 1956).
53
Macey, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 391–92.
54
See Sethi, 2009 WL 2963283, at *13 (considering the “strong public policy expressed by statute in our state, dating to colonial times, prohibiting illegal entry and
detainer” in evaluating whether defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous);
Givelber, supra note 6, at 65.
55
See, e.g., McCurdy v. Dillon, 98 N.W. 746, 748 (Mich. 1904) (stating that
“[p]ublic policy is interested in maintaining the family relation” and refusing to enforce an agreement giving a lawyer a contingent fee in a divorce case).
56
Givelber, supra note 6, at 66. Title VII prohibits other forms of discrimination
as well, including sex-based discrimination. To be clear, there is nothing approaching uniformity in the courts’ approaches in these types of cases. Some courts have
concluded that IIED claims that essentially amount to unlawful harassment are
preempted by state civil rights statutes or the exclusivity provisions of workers’ compensation statutes. Chamallas, supra note 38, at 2136–38. Other courts, perhaps attempting to preserve the distinction between statutory and tort theories involving the
workplace, have seemingly required IIED plaintiffs to show “something more than
discrimination or even persistent harassment to establish outrageousness in the employment context.” Id. at 2131.
57
484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984); see also Leone v. New England Commc’ns, No.
CV010509752S, 2002 WL 1008470, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2002) (stating
that “there is a strong public policy expressed by statute in our state prohibiting dis52
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Similarly, in Lawrence v. Leech, a Tennessee case, the defendantveterinarian was accused of intentionally inflicting emotional distress
upon the plaintiff by threatening to “do away with” the plaintiff’s dog
58
unless the plaintiff’s bill was paid in full. The veterinarian sought
59
refuge in a state statute dealing with such situations. Specifically,
the statute authorized a veterinarian to turn over an animal to the
humane society for disposal if the veterinarian provided written no60
tice ten days in advance to the owner of the animal. In Lawrence, the
veterinarian argued that his threat was not extreme and outrageous
because he had substantially complied with the requirements of the
61
statute. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that substantial compliance is not actual compliance and that “[t]he statute
[could] afford no shelter to the defendants in this particular case because the threats to do away with the animal” were not authorized by
62
the statute. Accordingly, the court concluded that a reasonable juror could find the defendant’s conduct to be extreme and outra63
geous.
Of course, not every legislative enactment reflects the same type
of clear social judgment. Enactments that are mainly technical in nature, for example, are unlikely to be reliable indicators of accepted
64
social norms. Similarly, even where the statute in question articulates a substantial public policy (such as in the case of antidiscrimination statutes), not every violation of a statute amounts to
65
extreme and outrageous conduct. For example, disability discrimination sometimes involves seemingly benign stereotypical assumptions about individuals with disabilities. Indeed, the discriminator
may believe he or she is acting in the best interests of an individual
with a disability in enacting some overly protective rule that excludes

crimination on the basis of race, sex or national origin” and concluding that employer who made repeated racial slurs engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct).
58
655 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tenn. 1983).
59
Id. at 928.
60
Id. at 931.
61
Id. at 929.
62
Id. at 930.
63
Id.
64
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 180 cmt. a (1981).
65
See Hoffman v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D.D.C. 1991)
(concluding that defendant’s age discrimination in violation of D.C. Human Rights
Act was not outrageous); Sethi v. Yaglidere, No. CV044003034S, 2009 WL 2963283, at
*13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2009) (concluding that defendant’s actions were not
outrageous despite the violation of statute expressing strong public policy).
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the individual. These forms of discrimination are, of course, illegal
and therefore intolerable; however, perhaps they are not “utterly intolerable” in the same way as, say, repeated instances of harassment or
67
abusive behavior on the basis of disability. At a minimum, however,
where a statute provides a reliable indicator of a societal judgment
about the wrongfulness of a defendant’s actions, reliance on the statute by courts and juries in aiding the outrageousness determination
seems appropriate in an area that cries out for some predictable
standards.
3.

Violation of Professional or Ethical Standards as Indicia
of Outrageousness

Courts have also occasionally looked to relevant professional or
ethical standards in determining whether a defendant’s conduct was
extreme and outrageous. In several cases involving physicians as defendants, the fact that the defendants’ conduct complied with the
standards of the medical profession led the courts to conclude that
68
the defendants’ conduct was not extreme and outrageous. In other
instances, courts have pointed to a defendant’s failure to conform his
or her conduct to applicable professional standards as being a rele69
vant consideration in the outrageousness analysis. For example, in
Conradt v. NBC Universal, Inc., a federal court in New York concluded
that the fact that the defendant violated numerous self-enforced professional standards of the journalism field was relevant for purposes
of determining whether the defendant’s conduct was extreme and

66

See Jeanette Cox, Crossroads & Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85
IND. L.J. 187, 198 (2010) (explaining that the text and legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act expresses a belief that paternalistic attitudes and overprotective rules are a form of discrimination).
67
See Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1079, 1120 (2002) (“Harassing conduct inflicted on an individual relating to the
individual’s disability is clearly included in the [intentional infliction of emotional
distress] tort, as long as the conduct and the harm reach the requisite level of severity.”).
68
See, e.g., Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 209 (Alaska 1995) (finding that doctor’s actions were not extreme and outrageous where actions conformed to applicable professional standards); Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622–23 (Tenn. 1997)
(concluding that because defendants’ conduct did not violate applicable medical
standards, it could not be regarded as extreme and outrageous).
69
See Cawood v. Booth, No. E2007-02537-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4998408, at *10
n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2008) (“In determining whether the complained of
conduct rises to the requisite level, the fact finder is allowed to consider the relevant
professional or ethical standards governing a particular group or community.”).
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70

outrageous.
The court concluded that although “unethical conduct, by itself, does not necessarily equate to outrageous conduct,”
the failure to abide by relevant professional standards may be rele71
vant on the question of outrageousness.
In some instances, a violation of a professional standard may be
an indicator that the conduct exceeds broader notions of acceptable
behavior. Professional standards and ethics codes sometimes provide
clear statements as to what forms of misconduct are impermissible
72
within a defined context. In many instances, professional codes of
conduct develop precisely because the profession recognizes that the
actions of its members may have adverse consequences on the public
73
interest and the broader community.
This of course does not mean that every violation of a professional standard amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct. For
example, some ethical standards create a strict liability or negligence
74
standard; thus, a defendant’s innocent or negligent violation would
75
be fairly weak evidence of outrageous conduct. But, again, to the
extent a standard defines inappropriate behavior by reference to an
important underlying policy consideration, formalized standards and
rules of professional conduct may potentially aid in the determination of the outrageousness of a defendant’s conduct.
Moreover, in some ways, resort to professional codes of conduct
in assessing outrageousness creates fewer potential problems for
courts than reliance on discrimination statutes and similar legislative
enactments. In the latter instances, courts have had to wrestle with
the question of whether to recognize a common law IIED claim
70

536 F. Supp. 2d 380, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. But see Keates v. City of Vancouver, 869 P.2d 88, 92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(concluding that expert’s opinion that defendant’s actions “were so lacking in the
expected professional standard of care as to be callously outrageous” did not create a
triable issue because opinion amounted to a legal conclusion).
72
See Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001)
(stating that the trend of ethics codes has been “away from broad standards and toward clearly defined rules”).
73
See generally Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519, 525
(Colo. 1996) (“[I]n order to qualify as public policy, the ethical provision [of a professional code of ethics] must be designed to serve the interests of the public rather
than the interests of the profession.”); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505,
512 (N.J. 1980) (stating that a professional code of ethics “designed to serve only the
interests of the profession” is not sufficient to qualify as an expression of public policy).
74
See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 34 (2010) (discussing whether a negligence or strict liability standard applies to a lawyer’s duty to maintain client confidentiality).
75
Nor would it satisfy the tort’s intent or recklessness requirement.
71
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where recovery might also be possible under a statute. In other
words, where a claim could sound in tort or statute, courts have had
to decide whether to treat IIED as a gap-filler tort, to be permitted
only where a plaintiff has no other remedy, or as a free-standing tort
77
that can serve as a compliment to an existing theory of recovery.
Resort to a voluntarily-adopted professional code of ethics does not
involve this same problem. While a member of a profession may be
subject to professional discipline for violation of an applicable ethical
provision, professional ethics codes do not and cannot, standing
78
alone, create a remedy for an aggrieved party. Thus, courts can look
to such codes in judging the outrageousness of a defendant’s conduct
without worrying about creating overlapping remedies and theories
of recovery while also undermining the policy choices underlying an
existing statute or tort theory.
III. APPLICATION OF THE RULES REGARDING INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE SPECIAL CASE OF LAWYER
MISCONDUCT
In light of the numerous positive expressions of what constitutes
impermissible attorney behavior, one might assume that the resolution of IIED claims against lawyers would be more predictable. However, tort law has long had difficulty dealing with the special case of
lawyer liability. Thus, if anything, the fact that the defendant is a lawyer in many cases tends to complicate the resolution of IIED claims.
A. For Outrageousness
Several of the well-established indicators of outrageousness
would seem, at first glance, to cut in favor of a finding of outrageousness in the case of a lawyer charged with intentional infliction of
emotional distress. First, the law governing lawyers is replete with
79
references to the special nature of the attorney-client relationship.
Lawyers occupy a position of special trust and confidence with respect to their clients and their duty is one of “uberrima fides”—one of
“most abundant good faith, requiring absolute and perfect candor,
openness and honesty, and the absence of any concealment or de-

76

See supra text accompanying note 54.
See Gergen, supra note 38, at 1697 (suggesting that the IIED tort should “disappear in the shadow of other, more specific doctrines in contract or tort law”).
78
Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 837 (R.I. 1997).
79
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 8, intro.
note (2000) (noting the special relationship between lawyers and clients).
77
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80

ception.” Many of the conflict of interest rules are premised on the
notion that a client is entitled to view his or her lawyer as the client’s
“advocate and champion” and would feel a particular sense of betrayal if the lawyer represented a party with adverse interests, even in a
81
completely unrelated matter. Therefore, at least in the case of a
client’s IIED claim against his or her lawyer, conduct that might not
otherwise be considered extreme and outrageous may rise to that level based on the special relationship between lawyer and client.
A lawyer may also be in a position to know of a client’s particular
vulnerability, thus potentially making it easier for a plaintiff to satisfy
82
the extreme and outrageous conduct requirement. For example,
the disciplinary rules governing solicitation of clients known to be in
need of legal services are premised, in part, on the notion that such
individuals are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to overreach83
ing on the part of unscrupulous lawyers. In many instances, lawyers
can be assumed to be aware of a client’s emotionally vulnerable
84
state, thus potentially rendering their conduct outrageous where it
otherwise might not be.
Even when an IIED plaintiff is an adversary and not a client, the
fact that the defendant-lawyer has violated an ethical rule may be an
85
indicator of outrageous conduct.
Unlike most IIED defendants,
lawyers are subject to a professional code of ethics and are subject to
professional discipline for their violations thereof. And unlike many
professional ethics codes, the ethical rules governing lawyers are
technically promulgated and enforced by a state’s highest court, a co86
equal branch of government. Thus, lawyer disciplinary rules possess
80

Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002).
See Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964) (stating that a
client is “entitled to feel that . . . he has the undivided loyalty of the [attorney] upon
whom he looks as his advocate and his champion”).
82
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
83
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 (1978) (“The substantive
evils of solicitation have been stated over the years in sweeping terms: stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential
harm to the solicited client in the form of overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1
(2011) (noting that a prospective client “may already feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services” and that special rules are
needed in such cases because “[t]he situation is fraught with the possibility of undue
influence, intimidation, and over-reaching”).
84
See In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d 496, 506 (N.J. 2010) (“Most clients are under
stress and feel vulnerable when consulting with counsel . . . .”).
85
See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
86
Alex B. Long, Retaliatory Discharge and the Ethical Rules Governing Attorneys, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1043, 1081–82 (2008).
81

LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/2/2012 6:07 PM

LAWYERS INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

71

statute-like qualities that many other professional codes do not. Finally, most of the specific rules contained in lawyer disciplinary codes
are not technical in nature or designed solely to protect the narrow
interests of the legal profession. Instead, the disciplinary process is
designed to further the administration of justice and protect the pub87
lic’s interest in a competent and ethical legal profession. Ultimately,
lawyer ethics codes frequently impose heightened standards of conduct in order to protect the public’s interest.
As a result, most courts have been willing to recognize that at
least some of the rules contained in lawyer ethics codes are expres88
sions of public policy. Accordingly, a lawyer who violates an ethical
rule governing the formation of a fee agreement with a client may, as
a matter of contract law, be unable to enforce the agreement on the
89
grounds that the agreement offends public policy. A lawyer’s violation of a disciplinary rule may have implications for a tort claim
grounded upon the violation of public policy. Courts have been willing to afford a remedy to lawyers who have been discharged by their
law firms for attempting to comply with their legal obligations on the
90
theory that such a discharge offends public policy.
A lawyer’s violation of an ethical rule may have other implications in the tort context. Although it is well-established that a lawyer’s violation of an ethical rule does not, by itself, provide a tort remedy for an aggrieved party, the Scope preceding the American Bar
Association’s (ABA) Model Rules notes that “since the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may
91
be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.” The
most obvious example would be where a plaintiff introduces evidence
of a lawyer’s breach of a disciplinary rule as evidence of the lawyer’s
92
negligence in a malpractice action. However, courts also sometimes
point to a lawyer’s violation of a disciplinary rule in assessing whether
the lawyer should be subject to liability under some other tort theory,
93
such as fraud.
87

See Lawyer Disciplinary Process v. Artimez, 540 S.E.2d 156, 164–65 (W. Va.
2000) (“The principle purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to safeguard
the public’s interest in the administration of justice.”) (citations omitted).
88
Long, supra note 86, at 1065.
89
See Long, supra note 45, at 301–21 (discussing examples).
90
See Long, supra note 86, at 1049–62 (discussing examples).
91
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope ¶ 20 (2011).
92
See Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (stating that
violation of disciplinary rule may constitute some evidence of negligence).
93
See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bell, 643 N.E.2d 310, 312 (Ind. 1994) (referencing disciplinary rule regarding fraud); Alex B. Long, Attorney Deceit Statutes: Promoting Professio-
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In at least some cases, a lawyer’s violation of an applicable ethical
rule would seem likely to tip the balance in favor of a finding of outrageousness. Logically, this would be most likely where the lawyer has
violated a duty lying at the core of what it means to be a lawyer, such
as the lawyer’s duties of loyalty and confidentiality. However, a violation of an ethical rule could, in theory, also help a non-client establish the outrageousness requirement. At least some ethical rules establish duties to non-clients that involve conduct that could quite
naturally form the basis of an IIED claim. This includes the rules
prohibiting the destruction or alteration of evidence and the rule
prohibiting lawyers from engaging in conduct having no purpose
94
other than to harass or intimidate another individual. Thus, the fact
that a lawyer—an officer of the court upon whom the law and the le95
gal profession impose special obligations —engages in misconduct
that adversely impacts non-clients could, in theory, potentially be an
indicator of outrageousness for purposes of an IIED claim.
B. Against Outrageousness
At the same time, there are several potential objections to relying on the standards contained in lawyer ethics codes as indicators of
outrageousness for purposes of IIED claims. More broadly, there are
several potential objections to expanding lawyer tort liability in general and expanding liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in particular. These include concerns over the impact on
zealous advocacy and permitting recovery for emotional distress.
1.

Violation of a Disciplinary Rule as an Indicator of
Outrageousness

The Model Rules observe that a lawyer’s violation of an ethical
rule may be evidence of the lawyer’s breach of an applicable standard
96
of conduct. However, some courts have been reluctant to allow evidence of a lawyer’s ethical violation to serve any role in tort litiga97
tion. Even where a court is willing to consider evidence of a lawyer’s
ethical violation, there remains the problem of when a violation is renalism Through Criminal Prosecutions and Treble Damages, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413,
420–28 (2010) (discussing disciplinary rules of potential relevance in a fraud or deceit action).
94
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a), 4.4(a) (2011).
95
Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, 903 N.E.2d 265, 269 (N.Y. 2009).
96
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
97
See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
175–76 (2010) (discussing the use of rules of professional conduct in malpractice actions).
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levant to the question of whether the lawyer’s conduct was extreme
and outrageous.
Some rules, such as the rule articulating a lawyer’s duty to maintain client confidentiality, speak to deeply-held principles of the legal
98
profession. At first glance, a violation of a rule that is fundamental
to the administration of justice and the legal profession’s values
would seem to provide strong evidence of outrageousness on a lawyer’s part. However, Model Rule 1.6(a)—the rule that articulates a
lawyer’s duty not to reveal information relating to the representation
99
of a client—is arguably a strict liability rule. At most, the rule requires mere negligence on a lawyer’s part before there is a viola100
tion.
In contrast, the concept of outrageous conduct implies willfulness, amounting to an extreme departure from relevant standards.
Although it is certainly conceivable that a lawyer’s reckless disregard
of client confidentiality could amount to outrageous conduct, the
negligent or innocent violation of Rule 1.6(a) is not the kind of ex101
treme conduct the Restatement (Second) of Torts contemplates.
Other ethical rules establish important prohibitions on lawyer
misconduct. However, some of these standards address gardenvariety misconduct, which would not, in the typical case, rise to the
level of extreme and outrageous conduct. For example, the fact that
102
a lawyer violates the ethical prohibition on dishonest conduct might
have some relevance on the question of outrageousness. However, if
the violation occurred in the course of the lawyer’s private rather

98

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011).
See Moore, supra note74, at 34 (discussing this issue).
100
See id. (discussing this issue and concluding that a negligence standard should
apply).
101
A lawyer’s intentional or reckless violation of a fundamental duty owed to a
client would logically provide a stronger indicator of extreme and outrageous conduct. However, in some cases a client may already have a remedy for such misconduct in the form of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. See Pietro v. Sacks, No. B208953,
2010 WL 298240, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2010) (involving breach of fiduciary
duty claim based on lawyer’s alleged threat to disclose confidential information in
order to prevent client from terminating representation); Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan,
822 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (involving breach of fiduciary duty and IIED
claims based on lawyer’s disclosure of confidential information to district attorney).
In a jurisdiction that views IIED as a gap-filler tort that can only be asserted where no
other theory of recovery would permit recovery, a lawyer’s intentional or reckless violation of a fiduciary duty enshrined in an ethical rule may mean that a client cannot
proceed on an IIED claim.
102
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2011).
99
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than professional life, there would be little reason to view the lawyer’s
103
dishonesty as any more outrageous than a non-lawyer’s dishonesty.
In contrast, a lawyer’s violation of the ethical rule prohibiting
false statements of material fact to another person while in the course
of representing a client might have greater relevance on the question of
outrageousness due to the fact that the lawyer’s actions interfere with
the administration of justice and undermine respect for the legal
104
process.
Even in this situation, however, a violation of this ethical
rule may have limited value in terms of establishing the outrageousness of a lawyer’s conduct. For example, a violation of the ethical
rule regarding competence tends to carry considerable weight in a
malpractice action in terms of establishing the lawyer’s breach of the
105
duty of care owed to a client. But false statements of material facts
come in all shapes and sizes, only some of which amount to conduct
utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Indeed, a comment to the relevant Model Rule notes that the making of false statements of material fact in the course of representing a client is, in some limited
circumstances, actually permissible, despite the literal language of the
106
ethical rule prohibiting such conduct. Not surprisingly then, plaintiffs have had little success arguing that a violation of a disciplinary
107
rule is, per se, extreme and outrageous conduct.
2.

Zealous Advocacy Concerns

There are also more general concerns about expanding lawyer
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Chief among
them is the concern that expanded liability might have an adverse
impact on the duty of zealous advocacy. One of the most cherished
values of the legal profession is the notion of a lawyer’s duty of zeal108
ous advocacy on behalf of a client. Although numerous commenta103

Numerous courts have concluded that “conduct by an attorney arising in the
attorney’s other, non-professional pursuits is also a proper subject of disciplinary
proceedings.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shaw, 732 A.2d 876, 885 (Md. 1999).
104
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 4.1(a) (2011) (prohibiting false statements of material fact in the course of representing a client).
105
See Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (citing Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924 (6th Cir. 1980)) (stating that evidence of a violation of
a disciplinary rule constitutes “rebuttable evidence of legal malpractice”).
106
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 4.1 cmt. 2 (2011) (stating that certain
types of statements, such as statements regarding a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement, are not treated as statements of fact for purposes of rule).
107
Nestlerode v. Fed. Ins. Co., 414 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 1979).
108
See Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41
EMORY L.J. 467, 470 (1992) (listing zealous advocacy as one of the central components of professionalism) (citing Monroe H. Freedman, The Golden Age of Law
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tors have criticized the tendency of lawyers to use the idea of zealous
advocacy as a shibboleth for dishonest and unethical behavior, the
value of zealous advocacy on behalf of a client remains deeply em109
bedded in the collective psyche of the legal profession.
The commitment to ensuring that lawyers are able and willing to
act as zealous advocates on behalf of their clients is also deeply embedded in tort law. For example, a lawyer who is participating in a
judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory material concerning another, provided the communication has some re110
lation to the proceeding. This litigator’s privilege is designed to ensure that lawyers are not dissuaded from acting zealously on behalf of
111
clients for fear of facing civil liability. For this reason, the privilege
112
is absolute in nature.
The litigator’s privilege is also far reaching.
Although originally developed in the defamation context, the privilege has been extended in some jurisdictions to reach a variety of litigation-related torts, including malicious prosecution and even misre113
presentation.
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers expresses a similar
theme in the context of IIED claims. A comment to section 56 emphasizes that “[v]igorous advocacy is important in adversary proceed114
ings.”
Consequently, “a lawyer’s partisanship in presenting evidence and argument, drafting and serving pleadings, and comparably
pressing a client’s case in such a proceeding is not considered extreme and outrageous and is privileged from [IIED] liability to the
115
opposing party.”
The concern over the impact of expanded tort liability on a lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy also manifests itself in tort law’s traditional refusal to recognize that a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient. Although there are exceptions, the general rule is that a law-

That Never Was, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 1990, reprinted in THE LAWYER AS PROFESSIONAL
(T.W. Floyd & W.F. Newton eds., 1991)).
109
See generally Allen K. Harris, The Professionalism Crisis—The ‘Z’ Words and Other
Rambo Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices’ Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 568–70
(2002) (criticizing lawyers’ reliance on the value of zealous advocacy to justify unprofessional behavior).
110
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 585 (1977).
111
See id. § 586 cmt. a (stating that the privilege “is based upon a public policy of
securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom in their efforts to
secure justice for their clients”).
112
Id.
113
Long, supra note 93, at 433.
114
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 cmt. g (2000).
115
Id.
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116

yer does not owe a duty to a non-client. This is particularly true in
117
the case of adversarial parties.
Part of the rationale for the reluctance to impose civil liability against lawyers for conduct that harms
non-parties is that it would place lawyers in the position of owing con118
flicting duties to clients and non-clients. Although this no-duty rule
is cited most commonly in negligence cases, the rule and its rationale
also sometimes find their way into the courts’ analyses of intentional
119
tort claims against lawyers.
3.

The Reluctance to Permit Recovery for Emotional
Distress

A final concern about expanding lawyer liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress is that it would conflict with tort law’s
longstanding reluctance to permit recovery for emotional distress
damages against lawyers. As a general matter, tort law has long expressed reluctance to permit recovery for emotional distress unac120
companied by any physical harm. For example, some jurisdictions
require that the emotional distress be “manifested by objective symp121
tomatology and substantiated by expert medical testimony.”
This reluctance also happens to coincide with the majority rule
prohibiting plaintiffs from recovering emotional distress damages in
122
attorney malpractice actions.
The limitation is based primarily on
the notion that emotional distress resulting from a lawyer’s mishan123
dling of a matter is not foreseeable. Courts have noted that “a citizen’s encounter with the legal process is a source of great anxiety”
even under the best of circumstances and even if represented by the
124
best of counsel. The rule is also based in part on the fear that lawyers would be subjected to a barrage of lawsuits from disgruntled
125
clients should emotional distress damages be permitted.
In addi116

Id. § 51.
See Long, supra note 93, at 431.
118
See id. at 432 (stating that courts frequently justify the rule on grounds that a
contrary rule might result in decreased loyalty to a client).
119
Id.
120
See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text.
121
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass. 1982).
122
See Wehringer v. Powers & Hall, P.C., 874 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D. Mass. 1995)
(predicting that Massachusetts courts would hold that recovery is only permitted in
exceptional circumstances); 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 9, § 21:11, at 38.
123
Lawrence W. Kessler, The Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the “Captured” Regulators of the Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 478–79 (2002).
124
Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1247 (Miss. 1991).
125
Id. at 479; Kessler, supra note 123, at 479.
117
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tion to generalized worries over excessive litigation, the particular
concern in allowing excessive litigation against lawyers is that it will
have an adverse effect on the willingness of lawyers to serve as zealous
advocates for their clients. Thus, regardless of whether a plaintiff’s
claim against a lawyer sounds in negligence or intentional infliction
of emotional distress, the legal profession’s concerns over the impact
on zealous advocacy remain substantial.
IV. LAWYER IIED CASES AND HOW THEY ILLUSTRATE THE ABOVE
POINTS
Despite the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ observation that the
question of whether conduct is extreme and outrageous is a jury
question—where reasonable minds could differ—numerous courts
126
take the position that it is a question of law for the court.
Even
those courts that treat the question as generally being one for the jury
often engage in especially rigorous scrutiny of a defendant’s conduct
127
in IIED cases. And in cases involving claims of extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of lawyers, courts often engage in exceptionally rigorous scrutiny.
A review of the decisional law involving IIED claims against attorneys reflects the tensions present in these cases as well as the overall doctrinal confusion surrounding the IIED tort. One can discern a
strong judicial reluctance to permit liability, particularly in the case of
lawyer’s liability to a non-client. Courts frequently conclude, as a
matter of law, that a lawyer’s misconduct was not extreme and outrageous. Yet, there are enough instances in which plaintiffs have managed to raise a triable issue regarding whether a lawyer’s conduct
was extreme and outrageous that it is difficult to speak in terms of
bright-line rules. Indeed, one of the more troubling aspects of the
decisional law in this area is the failure of courts to articulate, in any
meaningful way, why a lawyer’s conduct is or is not extreme and outrageous.

126
See, e.g., Atkinson v. Denton Publ’g Co., 84 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Texas law); Gray v. State, 624 A.2d 479, 484 (Me. 1993) (“The determination
of extreme and outrageous conduct from undisputed facts is an issue for the
court.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1977).
127
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
45 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).

LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

78

2/2/2012 6:07 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:55

A. Liability to Clients
1.

Incompetence and Lack of Diligence

Clients have had little success with IIED claims premised on an
attorney’s failure to live up to the duty of competence. The IIED tort
requires not only that a plaintiff demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct, but also that the defendant acted with intent or in a
128
reckless manner.
Although disgruntled clients have sometimes
tacked IIED claims on to their malpractice claims or attempted to categorize their attorneys’ negligence as extreme and outrageous behavior, courts have typically dispensed with such claims on the grounds
that the required mental state was lacking or that the defendant’s ac129
tions were not extreme and outrageous.
Thus, lawyers have es130
caped IIED liability for negligently conducting title searches, failing
131
to conduct adequate investigations, failing to secure or interview
132
witnesses, and failing to notify clients of their rights under applica133
ble statutes. Plaintiffs’ attempts to characterize a lawyer’s shortcomings in more grandiose terms—such as the failure to zealously advocate on the client’s behalf—have similarly failed where the failure
134
amounts to little more than garden-variety malpractice.

128

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Williams v. Callaghan, 938 F. Supp. 46, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1996) (concluding that lawyer’s failure to, inter alia, conduct adequate investigation, was not extreme and outrageous conduct); Galu v. Attias, 923 F. Supp. 590, 597–98 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that criminal defense attorney’s failure to make a motion did not
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Thornton v. Squyres, 877 S.W.2d 921,
923 (Ark. 1994) (holding that attorney’s failure to file an answer on behalf of client
could not form the basis of IIED claim, despite harm to client); Amstead v. McFarland, 650 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that attorney’s alleged malpractice in the form of failing to notify client of lawyer’s potential conflict of interest
and client’s rights under statute did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Young v. Hecht, 597 P.2d 682, 687 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of lawyer due to lack of evidence of intent to inflict emotional distress).
130
See, e.g., Caddell v. Gates, 327 S.E.2d 351, 352 (S.C. 1984); see also Menuskin v.
Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment in favor of
lawyer who negligently misrepresented that client’s property was unencumbered by a
lien).
131
See, e.g., Williams v. Callaghan, 938 F. Supp. 46, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1996).
132
See, e.g., id.; Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989)
133
See, e.g., Amstead, 650 S.E.2d at 742.
134
See, e.g., Williams, 938 F. Supp. at 51–52; see also Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96
P.3d 623, 629 (Idaho 2004) (concluding that lawyer’s failure to provide for bequest
for husband in wife’s will could not support husband’s claim of negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress).
129
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Clients have had perhaps slightly greater success where the attorney’s departure from the established duty of care involves a lack of
diligence—more than a lack of skill or knowledge. Although closely
related to the duty of competence, a lawyer’s duty to diligently
represent a client’s interests is listed separately from competence in
135
the Model Rules. A comment explains that diligence involves pursuit
of a client’s matter “despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer” and using “whatever lawful and ethical
136
measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.” A
comment to the rule expressly notes the potential that neglect of a
137
client matter may result in emotional distress to the client.
More often than not, attorneys have prevailed in IIED cases involving charges of willful neglect, even where neglect of client matters appears to be standard operating procedure for the lawyer in
138
question.
For example, Thornton v. Squyres involved a lawyer’s failure to file an answer in a child custody matter, resulting in the client
139
losing custody of her daughter. The client pursued an IIED claim
against the attorney, and at trial introduced evidence of “Squyres’s
total lack of any docket control system in disregard of his clients’ in140
terests [and] his failure to answer phone calls for three weeks.” If
true, this was not merely carelessness on the part of the attorney.
This was a pattern of conscious neglect in the face of a high probability of injury to clients. In addition, “when confronted with the result
of his omission, Thornton aver[ed] Squyres implied that he delibe141
rately did not file an answer because he was not paid in full.” Despite this, the trial judge stated that “this is just a matter of negligence
on the part of an attorney” and issued a directed verdict for the at142
torney. If the defendant’s actions could be considered extreme and
outrageous, the trial court reasoned, then any simple malpractice

135

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011).
Id. cmt. 1.
137
See id. R. 1.3 cmt. 3 (“[U]nreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety
and undermine confidence in the lawyer’s trustworthiness.”).
138
See O’Neil v. Vasseur, 796 P.2d 134, 141 (Idaho 1990) (concluding that lawyers’
failure to act in a case for nearly four years was not extreme and outrageous); see also
Williams, 938 F. Supp. at 51–52 (granting summary judgment for attorney where attorney failed to adequately investigate claims or interview witnesses); Timms v. Rosenblum, 713 F. Supp 948, 955 (E.D. Va. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff failed to
state a claim based on lawyer’s failure to interview or secure necessary witnesses).
139
877 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Ark. 1994).
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 923.
136
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143

case could become an IIED case. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme
Court agreed with the trial judge’s reasoning and affirmed the
judge’s conclusion that the attorney’s actions could not rise to the
level of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to support a ver144
dict for the client.
In contrast, Bowman v. Doherty involved a criminal defendant who
alleged that he repeatedly asked his attorney to obtain a continuance
145
due to the fact that he was out of town.
The attorney assured the
client that it would be no problem to obtain the continuance, but
146
failed to do so. After the client was arrested for failing to appear for
147
his scheduled hearing, he sued his lawyer for malpractice.
Citing
the majority rule that there can be no recovery for emotional distress
in a malpractice action, the defendant moved for partial summary
148
judgment on the plaintiff’s claims for emotional distress.
On appeal, however, the Kansas Supreme Court stated that this general rule
does not apply “in cases of a wrong where the act is wanton or willful
or where the act is committed with malice and intended to cause
149
mental distress.” A defendant acts “wantonly,” the court explained,
when the defendant acts with “‘reckless disregard or a complete indifference or an unconcern for the probable consequences of the
150
wrongful act.’”
The court ultimately concluded that because the
lawyer “should have known full well” that his client would end up in
jail if he failed to live up to his duty of competence, a jury could rea151
sonably conclude that the lawyer acted wantonly or recklessly. Similarly, in Lancaster v. Stevens, a Mississippi case, a convicted murderer’s
IIED claim against his attorneys survived summary judgment where
his habeas appeal had been dismissed due to his attorneys’ failure to
152
prosecute the appeal.
143

Id.
Id.
145
686 P.2d 112, 116 (Kan. 1984).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 115–16.
148
Id. at 117.
149
Id. at 118.
150
Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Murray, 521 P.2d 262, 267 (Kan. 1974)).
151
Bowman, 686 P.2d at 119. Although the Bowman court treated the client’s
claim as fitting within a narrow category of exceptions to the general rule that emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a malpractice action, the client’s legal
theory was virtually indistinguishable from an IIED claim. See id.
152
961 So. 2d 768 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Interestingly, the court permitted the
claim to proceed despite its conclusion that the habeas appeal would have failed
even if the attorneys had pursued the matter. Id.
144
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Thornton, Bowman, and Lancaster all involved lawyers who, at a
minimum, acted in reckless disregard of the probability of emotional
153
distress, a mental state sufficient to support a finding of IIED under
154
The potential consequences of the lawthe Restatement approach.
yers’ neglect were dramatic in each case, and there was almost certainly a violation of the duty of diligence on the part of each of the
lawyers. Thus, a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct in each
case hardly seems a stretch. Yet, the split in outcomes illustrates how
difficult it may be to predict whether a court will permit an IIED
claim against an attorney to proceed.
2.

Demands for Sexual Favors

One recurring scenario that has triggered numerous disciplinary
complaints and IIED claims has involved attorneys who have de155
manded sexual favors from clients.
In some cases, the attorney’s
conduct has amounted to harassment. In others, the demands have
been accompanied by explicit or implicit threats to withhold legal
156
services or offers to accept sexual favors in lieu of payment.
Although clients have not always succeeded on their IIED claims due to
some of the other restrictions of the tort, courts have generally been
willing to conclude that sexual demands from clients amount to extreme and outrageous conduct where the harassment is pervasive or
157
is accompanied by these types of threats or offers.
153
As Bowman illustrates, some courts have been willing to recognize a specific exception to the rule that emotional distress damages are unavailable in a legal malpractice action when the malpractice results in the loss of liberty. E.g.,Wagenmann v.
Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987); 3 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 9, § 21:11, at
38.
154
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Some jurisdictions require that a defendant acted with the specific intent of causing distress. See, e.g., Ely v. Whitlock,
385 S.E.2d 893, 897 (Va. 1989).
155
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 373 (Ct. App. 1991); Brett v.
Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. 1998); Doe v. Roe, 681 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli, 712 N.E.2d 119 (Ohio 1999); BuckmanPeirson v. Brannon, 822 N.E.2d 830, 836 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004); Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 838 (R.I. 1997); In re Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 856 (S.D. 1990).
See generally Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (involving
legal malpractice claim based on similar conduct); Malinda L. Seymore, AttorneyClient Sex: A Feminist Critique of the Absence of Regulation, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 175,
176 (2003) (describing a variety of disciplinary cases involving lawyers who have had
sex with clients).
156
See, e.g., McDaniel, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 370; Buckman-Peirson, 822 N.E.2d at 836;
Vallinoto, 688 A.2d at 833.
157
See, e.g., Buckman-Peirson, 822 N.E.2d at 836 (concluding that plaintiff’s claim
failed due to lack of evidence regarding emotional distress and causation); Vallinoto,
688 A.2d at 838 (concluding that plaintiff’s claim failed due to inability to produce
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Clients have had noticeably less success when the claim does not
involve an allegation of sexual coercion or a pattern of harassment
and is instead based primarily on the mere fact that a sexual relation158
ship between lawyer and client existed.
Courts have historically
been disinclined to recognize IIED claims involving spurned lovers
159
and matters of the heart. However, sex between lawyers and their
clients arguably implicates special concerns. ABA Model Rule 1.8(j)
generally prohibits a lawyer from engaging in sexual relations with a
160
client. The comment accompanying the rule explains that the rule
is based, in part, on the fact that there is almost always a disparity of
161
Further, because a lawyer
power in the lawyer-client relationship.
“occupies the highest position of trust and confidence,” there is the
162
potential for a lawyer to exploit the trust of the client. In imposing
discipline against lawyers for engaging in sexual relationships with
clients, courts have noted that clients may be particularly vulnerable
due to their need for legal representation, thus increasing the risks of
emotional harm stemming from a lawyer’s exploitation of client
163
trust. Despite these special concerns, courts have been reluctant to
admissible evidence of “physical symptomatology resulting from the alleged improper conduct”).
158
See, e.g., Guiles v. Simser, 804 N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (dismissing
IIED claim where lawyer and client engaged in a consensual sexual relationship
“characterized by an exchange of many expressions of loving endearments”); Sanders v. Rosen, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805, 811–12 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (concluding that attorney who
terminated relationship with client had not engaged in extreme and outrageous
conduct); Gaspard v. Beadle, 36 S.W.3d 229, 238 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding
that lawyer’s act of billing client after he broke off sexual relationship with her did
not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct).
159
See, e.g., Quinn v. Walsh, 732 N.E.2d 330, 338–39 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (dismissing former husband’s IIED action against wife’s paramour on the grounds that it
was barred by heart balm statute or, alternatively, was not outrageous); id. at 339
(noting that majority of courts have concluded that adulterous conduct is not extreme and outrageous for purposes of IIED claim); M.N. v. D.S., 616 N.W.2d 284, 288
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff’s IIED claim based on defendant’s
fraudulent promise to leave his wife was barred by state statute abolishing “heartbalm” actions); Sanders, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 811–12 (noting that New York does not permit IIED claims stemming from marital disputes or the termination of a romantic or
sexual relationship).
160
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (2007).
161
Id. cmt. 17.
162
Id.
163
See, e.g., People v. Beecher, 224 P.3d 442, 450 (Colo. 2009) (“[M]ost parties to
a divorce action are extremely emotionally vulnerable.”); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 838 n.4 (Wash. 2000) (stating that by engaging
in sexual relationships with clients, lawyer was exposing clients “to greater risks of
emotional harm”), abrogated on other grounds by In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Anschell, 69 P.3d 844, 853 n.5 (Wash. 2003); see also Okla. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics
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allow IIED claims stemming from consensual relationships between
lawyers and clients to reach juries.
In contrast, when a lawyer’s sexual advances are unwelcome and
are either repeated or involve implied threats to withhold services,
courts are more willing to classify the conduct as outrageous. Lawyers
have faced significant disciplinary sanctions for engaging in such
164
conduct. However, in addressing IIED claims against attorneys who
requested sexual favors in return for legal services, courts have
tended not to rely upon the violation of applicable rules of professional conduct in deciding whether a lawyer’s actions were outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim. Courts have, however, pointed
to the concerns underlying the prohibition on sexual relations with
clients in concluding that a lawyer’s actions were outrageous. Specifically, courts have pointed to the special relationship of trust between
lawyer and client, the lawyers’ knowledge of the fact that a client is
often in an emotional or vulnerable state resulting from the need for
legal representation, and the potential for exploitation of these reali165
ties. Ultimately then, it is not the existence of a sexual relationship
per se that is extreme and outrageous, “but rather the attorney’s attempt to exploit the professional relationship to gain unsolicited sex166
ual favors.”

Comm., Ethics Op. No. 308 (noting that “clients involved in domestic, child custody,
criminal, and pro bono cases” are particularly vulnerable to the use of confidential
client in an attempt to manipulate the client into a sexual relationship). See generally
In re Berg, 955 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Kan. 1998) (involving lawyer who had sex with suicidal divorce client).
164
See, e.g., In re Piatt, 951 P.2d 889, 891–92 (Ariz. 1997) (censuring attorney for
harassing female clients and threatening to withdraw from representation if clients
did not consent); Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713
N.W.2d 682, 703–04 (Iowa 2006) (indefinitely suspending lawyer for engaging in
“sex-for-fees arrangement”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423,
451 (Md. 2004) (disbarring attorney for, inter alia, threatening to withdraw from representation unless the client consented to sexual contact); In re Witherspoon, 3
A.3d 496, 506–07 (N.J. 2010) (suspending lawyer for one year for attempting to barter legal services for sex); Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Feneli, 712 N.E.2d 119, 121 (Ohio
1999) (suspending lawyer for eighteen months for attempting to barter legal services
for sex); In re Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 857 (S.D. 1990) (suspending lawyer for one
year for engaging in sexual relationships with clients). But see In re Witherspoon, 3
A.3d at 512 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (“Any new attorney, fresh from the law school
study of ethics and professional responsibility, will wonder how any penalty short of
disbarment would be appropriate discipline for respondent’s behavior.”).
165
See, e.g., McDaniel v. Gile, 230 Cal. App. 3d 363, 373 (Ct. App. 1991); In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d at 506 (“Most clients are under stress and feel vulnerable when consulting with counsel.”).
166
Sanders v. Rosen, 605 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
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For example, Buckman-Peirson v. Brannon involved a client’s alle167
gation of repeated sexual harassment by her attorney. On the lawyer’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court observed that, on
its face, the lawyer’s conduct was not beyond all bounds of decency;
however, the fact that the defendant was a lawyer “complicated” mat168
ters.
The court explained that due to the fact that litigation was
ongoing, the client “may have felt compelled to put up with many of
defendant’s shenanigans in order to successfully conclude her litiga169
tion.”
Thus, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude
170
that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.
3.

Permitting or Concealing Conflicts of Interest and
Other Breaches of Loyalty

Another possible scenario involves the attorney who permits or
conceals a conflict of interest or who otherwise breaches the duty of
171
loyalty owed to a client. Loyalty to clients is one of the fundamental
172
values of the legal profession. Thus, there is a potentially strong argument that an intentional betrayal of that duty could, in appropriate
circumstances, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
a.

Conflicts of Interest

One component of a lawyer’s duty of loyalty is the duty to avoid
173
conflicts of interest. While conflicts may arise from any number of
sources, perhaps most common are the situations in which a lawyer
represents multiple clients with adverse interests or represents a
client in the same or substantially related matter in which the lawyer
174
formerly represented a client.
In the former instance, one of the
primary concerns is the sense of betrayal and the loss of trust a current client may feel upon learning that his or her lawyer—the client’s
167

822 N.E.2d 830, 832 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 835.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 836.
171
See, e.g., Meyers v. Sudfeld, No. Civ.A.05-2970, 2006 WL 401855, at *6–7 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 1, 2006); Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 368 (Cal. 1990); McMahon v.
West, No. B154225, 2003 WL 22245881, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2003); Sellens v.
Am. States Ins. Co., No. 90976, 2004 WL 2160770, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 24,
2004); Kingsley v. Neumeier, No. 06-P-732, 2007 WL 2458480, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Aug. 30, 2007); Goodman v. Kotzen, 647 A.2d 247, 248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
172
See Saunders v. State, 10 So. 3d 53, 94 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (stating that the
duty of loyalty to a client is “fundamental”).
173
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4 (1986).
174
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2011); id. R. 1.9(a).
168
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“advocate and . . . champion”—is representing another party with in175
terests that are in conflict with those of the client.
In the case of
former client conflicts, the primary concern is the danger that, in order to adequately represent the current client, the lawyer will use relevant, confidential information provided by the former client to the
176
former client’s disadvantage.
Disciplinary authorities sometimes
view the fact that a lawyer benefits from a conflict of interest as an aggravating factor in deciding what type of professional discipline is ap177
propriate.
Regardless of the type of conflict at issue, breach of fiduciary du178
ty and legal malpractice claims are fairly common. Where the lawyer in question intentionally conceals a conflict from a client, a fraud
179
claim might be more appropriate. However, at least one court has
imported a rule from the law regarding legal malpractice and held
that in order to prevail on such a fraud claim, a client must establish
that the conflict actually caused the client to lose on the underlying
180
claim. Thus, causation may be a problem for some clients alleging
181
fraud.
Accordingly, an IIED claim might theoretically be an alternative.
In the few decided cases involving this issue, however, plaintiffs have
had little success convincing courts that intentional concealment of a
conflict of interest or continued representation in the face of an ob175

Grievance Comm. v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82, 84 (Conn. 1964).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 3 (2011) (“Matters are ‘substantially related’ for purposes of this Rule if . . . there otherwise is a substantial risk that
confidential factual information as would normally have been obtained in the prior
representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter.”).
177
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.31 (1986) (stating that
disbarment is generally appropriate when lawyer has a conflict of interest and, inter
alia, seeks to benefit).
178
See, e.g., Kan. City Mall Assocs., Inc. v. McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A.,
No. 102,151, 2010 WL 920847, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2010) (involving negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims stemming from alleged conflict of interest); Trs. of Ohio Carpenters’ Pension Fund v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 938 N.E.2d 61,
62–63 (Ohio 2010) (same). Although there is potential overlap between these theories, “[p]rofessional negligence implicates a duty of care, while breach of a fiduciary
duty implicates a duty of loyalty and honesty.” Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 896 A.2d
777, 797 (Conn. 2006).
179
See Kingsley v. Neumeier, No. 06-P-732, 2007 WL 2458480, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct.
Aug. 30, 2007) (involving misrepresentation claim against attorney based on concealment of conflict of interest).
180
Id. at *1–2.
181
But see Meyers v. Sudfeld, No. Civ.A.05-2970, 2006 WL 401855, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 1, 2006) (concluding plaintiff who alleged fraudulent concealment of a conflict
on the part of attorney had stated a claim for fraud).
176
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182

vious conflict amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct.
For
example, in the New York case of Sherbak v. Doughty, an attorney allegedly represented both sides in a real estate transaction and then
took actions contrary to the plaintiff’s interests, including instituting
183
a lawsuit against him. The court—in one sentence and without explanation—concluded that although the plaintiff may have stated a
claim for malpractice, the attorney’s actions did not, as a matter of
184
law, rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
An exception to the trend away from finding liability or explaining conclusions regarding the outrageousness of the defendant’s ac185
tion is the Kentucky case of Goebel v. Arnett. In Goebel, the plaintiff
contacted an adoption agency about putting her expected child up
186
187
for adoption. The agency referred her to a lawyer, Arnett. However, the agency failed to inform the plaintiff that Arnett was also the
188
sole shareholder of the agency. Arnett informed the plaintiff that a
couple wished to adopt the child and would pay for the plaintiff’s le189
However, Arnett failed to inform the
gal and medical expenses.
190
plaintiff that the agency would also be receiving a separate fee. Finally, when the child’s father challenged custody, Arnett persuaded
191
the plaintiff to perjure herself.
In concluding that the plaintiff’s
IIED claim should survive summary judgment, the court opined that
Arnett’s conduct “fell outside the bounds of common decency and
most assuredly constituted allegations of serious violations of the
192
Code of Professional Conduct governing all attorneys.”
Based on
the existence of an attorney-client relationship, the plaintiff “was entitled at all times to rely on Arnett’s duty of loyalty and to expect can-

182
See id. at *6 (dismissing claim because “a cause of action for outrageous conduct does not exist under Pennsylvania law”); Amstead v. McFarland, 650 S.E.2d 737,
741–42 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that lawyer’s failure to advise client about
potential conflicts posed by his representation of both client and her ex-husband was
not extreme and outrageous); Kingsley, 2007 WL 2458480, at *2 (“[Plaintiff] failed to
claim or provide evidence that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous.”).
183
420 N.Y.S.2d 724, 725 (App. Div. 1979).
184
Id.
185
259 S.W.3d 489 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
186
Id. at 490.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Goebel, S.W.3d at 491.
192
Id. at 493.
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193

did advice tailored to promote her best interests.” Instead, Arnett
deceived and took advantage of the plaintiff’s known vulnerable con194
195
dition. Thus, the plaintiff’s claim survived summary judgment.
b.

Other Breaches of Loyalty

Decisional law involving IIED claims premised upon other
breaches of loyalty to clients is decidedly more mixed. As is the case
more generally, lawyers have tended to prevail on the question of extreme and outrageous conduct where their actions allegedly
196
represent a betrayal of trust. In some instances, the betrayals have
197
been quite serious. For instance, in Green v. Leibowitz, the lawyer affirmatively lied to the client about the status and filing of the client’s
198
claim for disability benefits. A New York appellate court concluded
that, despite the lawyer’s fiduciary duty to the client and despite the
fact that the client had stated a claim for fraud, the lawyer’s actions,
199
as a matter of law, were not extreme and outrageous. As is common
when courts find that a lawyer’s conduct does not qualify as extreme
and outrageous, the court reached its conclusion merely by referencing the Restatement’s “beyond all bounds of decency” standard and
summarily stating that the lawyer’s conduct did not satisfy this stan200
dard.
Yet, in other instances, clients have enjoyed more success on
their IIED claims based on similar breaches. In Singleton v. Foreman,
the lawyer entered into an unethical contingent fee agreement with
201
his client in a divorce proceeding. When the client expressed a desire to her attorney to settle her case, the attorney “exploded into a
193

Id.
Id.
195
Id. at 494.
196
See, e.g., Jones v. Law Firm of Hill & Ponton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1290–91
(M.D. Fla. 2002) (concluding that lawyer’s improper withdrawal from representation
and failure to provide imprisoned client with notice of withdrawal, deliver necessary
papers, or allow client time to employ another lawyer was not extreme and outrageous); Miller v. Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan & Glassman, 978 P.2d 922, 932
(Kan. 1999) (failing to keep client “apprised of the progress of his case and in failing
to notify him of the settlement hearing was a serious breach of fiduciary duty” but
did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Sawabani v. Desenberg,
372 N.W.2d 559, 565 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (publishing allegedly defamatory statements about client to client’s insurer was not extreme and outrageous).
197
See, e.g., Green v. Leibowitz, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146, 148 (App. Div. 1979).
198
Id.
199
Id. at 148–49.
200
Id. at 148; see supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
201
435 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1970).
194
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torrent of abuse, refused to allow her to settle, and threatened to ruin
202
both Mrs. Singleton and her husband.”
Pointing to the lawyer’s
ethical responsibility to not allow his personal feelings to impact his
representation of the client, the court concluded that the client had
203
stated an IIED claim. In a Mississippi case, a client won a substantial jury award based on the fact that his lawyer had engaged in an
204
adulterous affair with his wife.
4.

Disclosure of Confidential Information

Another situation in which clients have had at least some success
in pursuing IIED claims against their attorneys has been when the at205
torneys have wrongfully disclosed confidential client information.
In Herbin v. Hoeffel, the plaintiff brought an IIED claim against his attorney, alleging that the attorney had breached his duty of confiden206
tiality by disclosing information in order to assist the prosecution.
The D.C. Court of Appeals referred to a lawyer’s duty to maintain
client confidences as one of “uberrima fides” and noted that the duty
applied not just to information protected by the attorney-client privi207
lege but to unprivileged secrets as well. Citing a lawyer’s ethical duties, the court stated that “‘[a]ctions which violate public policy may
constitute outrageous conduct sufficient to state a cause of action for
208
infliction of emotional distress.’”
Ultimately, the court concluded
that “[i]n light of the high value we place on a lawyer’s duty of loyalty
and to preserve client confidences,” the attorney’s actions, if proven,
could amount to extreme and outrageous conduct for purposes of an
209
IIED claim.
B. Liability to Non-Clients
Clients have had mixed success with their IIED claims against
lawyers. Non-clients face an even more formidable challenge. A lawyer and a non-client typically do not have a relationship of trust. Similarly, one of the well-established rules of tort law as applied to law-

202

Id. at 970 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 970–71.
204
Pierce v. Cook, 992 So. 2d 612, 615 (Miss. 2008).
205
See, e.g., Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 265–67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(reversing summary judgment in favor of lawyers on client’s IIED and breach of fiduciary duty claims based on lawyers’ disclosure of client information to prosecutors).
206
806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C. 2002).
207
Id. at 197.
208
Id. (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984)).
209
Id.
203
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210

yers is that lawyers owe no duty of care to non-clients. Given these
realities, it may be especially difficult for a non-client to establish that
a lawyer’s conduct was extreme and outrageous for purposes of an
211
IIED claim.
The burden is only heightened when the lawyer and
non-client are on opposites sides of a matter and therefore have an
adversarial relationship. But as is the case more generally with IIED,
it is sometimes difficult to predict the outcomes in these cases.
1.

Litigation-Related Misconduct and Incivility

a.

Litigation-Related Misconduct

An opposing party’s tort claims against a lawyer based on the
lawyer’s alleged misconduct during the litigation process raise concerns about the chilling effect on zealous advocacy on behalf of a
212
client. Perhaps for this reason, opposing parties have had little success against lawyers on their IIED claims based on litigation-related
behavior. For example, it is nearly black-letter law at this point that
the filing of a legal action is not, by itself, extreme and outrageous
213
conduct. Even if the filing of a legal action could qualify, the absolute litigation privilege might nonetheless shield an attorney from
214
liability.

210

Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 96 P.3d 623, 628 (Idaho 2004).
See Argoe v. Three Rivers Behavioral Ctr. & Psychiatric Solutions, 697 S.E.2d
551, 555 (S.C. 2010) (affirming summary judgment in attorney’s favor on plaintiff’s
IIED claim due to lack of attorney-client relationship).
212
Young v. Allstate Ins. Co., 198 P.3d 666, 682–83 (Haw. 2008).
213
See, e.g., Tappen v. Ager, 599 F.2d 376, 382 (10th Cir. 1979) (affirming dismissal on IIED claim stemming from, inter alia, the filing of a baseless lawsuit resulting
from attorney’s inadequate investigation); Savell, Williams, Cox & Angel v. Coddington, 335 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (“The behavior attributed to the [defendants] in this case cannot reasonably be characterized as humiliating, insulting,
or terrifying, being confined, as it was, to the preparation and filing of legal pleadings.”) (citations omitted); see also Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d
151, 169 (Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that defendant’s filing of interpleader action
did not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct); Rolleston v. Huie, 400 S.E.2d
349, 351 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (“[T]he mere filing of a lawsuit is not the type of humiliating, insulting or terrifying conduct which will give rise to a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.”); Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1040
(Mass. 1982) (concluding that attorney did not engage in extreme and outrageous
conduct by commencing collection action against plaintiffs on behalf of client);
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 32 (Utah 2003) (“An
allegation of improper filing of a lawsuit or the use of legal process against an individual is not redressable by a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.”).
214
See Bennett, 70 P.3d at 32.
211
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Despite plaintiffs’ general lack of success in this area, it is certainly conceivable that filing a complaint or motion or threatening to
do so could rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.
When, for example, a demand letter is accompanied by extortionate
215
threats, an IIED claim might be a possibility.
IIED plaintiffs, however, have had little success establishing that a threat made during
the course of representation satisfied the “extreme and outrageous”
216
threshold.
Engaging in vexatious or harassing litigation tactics might also
possibly rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Lawyers
217
are, of course, ethically prohibited from asserting frivolous claims.
They are also prohibited from engaging in actions that “have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
218
person.”
Lawyers are also ethically prohibited from engaging in
dishonest behavior during the litigation process, including destroying
219
evidence and knowingly introducing perjured testimony.
But, as a whole, IIED plaintiffs have had little success on claims
involving possibly overly zealous representation. Although there is
sometimes the same tendency in these cases for a court to simply recite the Restatement’s “beyond all bounds of decency” language and
include boilerplate citation to precedent, courts are more likely in
this context to explain their conclusions with reference to the con220
cern over chilling legitimate advocacy.
For example, in East River
215

See Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2006) (involving allegations of civil extortion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful interference with
economic advantage stemming from demand letter).
216
See,e.g., Ulmer v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that lawyer’s threat to force opposing party into bankruptcy if he did not accept
settlement offer was not extreme and outrageous); see also Keller v. Ray, Quinney &
Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D. Utah 1995) (concluding that attorney’s threat
to put plaintiff out of business, “take everything he owned,” and “follow Plaintiff to
his grave” unless plaintiff dropped matter against defendant was not extreme and
outrageous). Instigating criminal proceedings against a party during a civil proceeding stands on somewhat different footing and is discussed in greater detail infra Part
IV.B.3.a.
217
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010).
218
Id. R. 4.4(a).
219
Id. R. 4.1; id. R. 8.4(c); id. R. 3.4(a). See generally Kachig v. Boothe, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 393, 402–03 (Ct. App. 1971) (involving IIED claim based upon introduction of
false evidence); Mongardi v. Kiely, No. 015367, 2002 WL 31379946, at *2 (Mass. Dist.
Ct. Sept. 18, 2002) (involving IIED claim based upon perjured testimony); Sharonville v. Am. Emp’r Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833, 835 (Ohio 2006) (involving claims of
spoliation of evidence and IIED based upon alleged cover-up of evidence by police
officers).
220
See, e.g., Devlin v. Fishman, 224 Cal. Rptr. 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding
that filing a lawsuit known to be vulnerable to a statute of limitations defense was not
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Savings Bank v. Steele, a Georgia court held as a matter of law that a
lawyer who accused the plaintiff of perjury during cross-examination
and threatened to bring perjury charges against the plaintiff did not
engage in extreme and outrageous conduct, despite the fact that the
221
statements allegedly led the plaintiff to suffer a heart attack. While
referring to the lawyer’s “severe cross-examination” as “discourteous
and unprofessional,” the court was concerned about the impact that
subjecting the lawyer to tort liability would have on lawyers’ willingness to engage in rigorous cross-examination:
Litigation and, more particularly, cross-examination are by design
rough-and-tumble, fraught with stress and tension. . . . Crossexamination is the cornerstone of our trial system. Through
probing and challenging questioning by a zealous advocate, the
jury and the judge are aided in evaluating the witness, and ultimately perceiving the truth. While it is the duty of the trial court
to protect a witness from abuse, the widest possible latitude must
be given to the advocate in order to ensure a thorough and sifting
222
cross-examination.

Courts have likewise been reluctant to classify delaying or misleading
223
behavior during the discovery process as extreme and outrageous.
Ordinarily, the fact that individuals are on opposite sides of litigation negates any possibility of a relationship of trust for purposes of
tort law. For example, a litigant generally has no cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation against the attorney for the other side
extreme and outrageous); Heim v. Cal. Fed. Bank, 828 A.2d 129, 141 (Conn. App.
Ct. 2003) (concluding that attorney who allegedly engaged in a variety of misconduct, including withholding documents and refusing to withdraw a motion for a deficiency judgment after it had been dismissed by the court, did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct); Wong v. Panis, 772 P.2d 695, 700 (Haw. Ct. App.
1986) (concluding attorney’s acts of filing counterclaims and submitting allegedly
abusive interrogatories on behalf of clients was not extreme and outrageous); Preis v.
Durio, 649 So. 2d 600, 603 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (granting lawyer’s motion to dismiss
IIED claim based on lawyer’s discussion with children of father’s adulterous behavior
during divorce proceeding); see also Vasile v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 20 F. Supp.
465, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1327 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that
“[a]dvocating on behalf of one’s client” does not constitute extreme and outrageous
conduct). But see Green v. Fischbein, Olivieri, Rozenholc & Badillo, 522 N.Y.S.2d
529, 531 (App. Div. 1987) (denying summary judgment to lawyer who, on behalf of
client, “engaged in a concerted course of conduct designed to harass, intimidate and
interfere with plaintiff’s tenancy,” including filing numerous meritless eviction proceedings).
221
311 S.E.2d 189, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
222
Id. at 191. See generally Nestlerode v. Fed. Ins. Co., 414 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App.
Div. 1979) (holding that lawyer who made intimidating remarks to opposing party
during recess at trial did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct).
223
See, e.g., Cunningham v. Jensen, No. 29770, 2004 WL 2034988, at *6 (Idaho Ct.
App. Sept. 14, 2004).
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224

due to the absence of any duty of care on the part of the attorney.
But, an exception exists when the lawyer invites reliance and assumes
225
a duty toward the other litigant.
Similarly, a plaintiff pursuing an
IIED claim against an opposing attorney for litigation-related misconduct may have difficulty establishing that the opposing attorney’s
conduct was extreme and outrageous due to the fact that the attorney
did not violate a relationship of trust—one of the hallmarks of ex226
treme and outrageous conduct.
A finding of extreme and outrageous conduct under such circumstances is not, however, completely
out of the circumstances.
In Silberg v. Anderson, for example, a husband brought a variety
of claims, including IIED, against his former wife’s divorce attorney,
227
Anderson.
As part of the dissolution proceedings, the parties
228
agreed to psychological evaluation and counseling.
With the husband’s approval, Anderson recommended a psychologist named Ad229
ler. However, Anderson allegedly failed to inform the husband that
230
she had a romantic relationship with Adler.
When Adler’s evaluation of the husband turned out to be less positive than the husband
would have liked, thus allegedly resulting in less advantageous visita231
tion rights, the husband sued Anderson for IIED.
The trial court
sustained Anderson’s demurrer, but on appeal, the appellate court
gave the husband leave to amend his IIED claim to include an allega232
tion of deception.
Silberg illustrates that the fact that the plaintiff and defendant are
on opposites sides of litigation does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from proceeding on an IIED claim. In Silberg, the appellate court
conceded that there was no relationship of trust between the plaintiff
233
and the defendant.
But, the court also observed that, as alleged,
Anderson had abused her position “as an officer of the court” to the
detriment of Silberg, thus implying that Anderson’s actions were

224

Long, supra note 93, at 434.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51(2) (2000).
226
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
227
786 P.2d 365, 367–68 (Cal. 1990).
228
Id. at 367.
229
Id.
230
Id. at 367–68.
231
Id.
232
Silberg v. Anderson, 249 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701–02 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled by
786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990).
233
Id. at 702 (noting lawyers owe no duty of care to opposing parties).
225
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234

more egregious by virtue of her status as a lawyer.
In addition, as
the underlying matter involved the dissolution of marriage and child
custody issues, Anderson, as a lawyer, had knowledge of Silberg’s par235
ticular susceptibility to emotional distress.
Nonetheless, Silberg also illustrates the difficulty IIED plaintiffs
face when attempting to hold an opposing attorney liable for litigation misconduct. On appeal, the California Supreme Court concluded that the litigator’s absolute privilege for statements made in
the course of litigation applied and shielded Anderson from liabili236
ty. According to the court, the privilege is “the backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system” and is essential to
preserving the ability of lawyers to zealously advocate on behalf of
237
their clients. Courts have applied this privilege with respect to other forms of litigation-related conduct, including the filing of a lawsuit
and the making of defamatory statements in connection with litiga238
tion.
In other instances, courts have concluded that a lawyer’s actions on behalf of a client in connection with the litigation process
are privileged more generally, without specific reference to the litiga239
tor’s privilege. Thus, even where a lawyer’s conduct toward an opposing party is so egregious that it satisfies the “extreme and outrageous” threshold, the absolute litigator’s privilege may prevent
recovery.
b.

Incivility

One of the more common refrains in the legal profession (and
society more generally) is that there has been a steady decline in civil234

Id.
Id.; see supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing litigants’ particular
susceptibility to emotional distress in such cases).
236
Silberg, 786 P.2d at 374.
237
Id. at 370.
238
E.g., Rose v. Wissinger, 439 A.2d 1193, 1199 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Bennett v.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 32 (Utah 2003); see also Chauncey v. Niems, 227 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727 (Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that defendant’s
act of filing lengthy interrogatories knowing they alleged false and fraudulent facts to
mislead opposing part and the court was privileged); Sullivan v. Birmingham, 416
N.E.2d 528, 534 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (concluding that lawyer’s inclusion of an ad
damnum clause in complaint in violation of state statute was privileged); Rabinowitz v.
Wahrenberger, 966 A.2d 1091, 1097–98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (concluding
that privilege applied to lawyer’s rigorous questioning of father during a deposition
in a case involving the death of father’s child); Abrams v. Pecile, 924 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53
(App. Div. 2011) (concluding that lawyer’s refusal to return allegedly stolen photograph in an attempt to force plaintiff to settle underlying case was privileged).
239
See Rohda v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 689 F. Supp. 1034, 1044 (D. Colo. 1988)
(concluding lawyer was privileged to move for new trial on behalf of client).
235
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240

ity in recent decades.
Tales and disciplinary decisions involving
unprofessional behavior on the part of lawyers during the litigation
241
process abound. The legal profession has attempted to address this
perceived rise in incivility in various ways, ranging from the promotion of inns of court to the promulgation of civility and professional242
ism codes.
Another possibility for a party aggrieved by a lawyer’s
243
rude and uncivil behavior might be an IIED claim.
An attorney’s discourteous behavior might implicate a number
of disciplinary rules. For instance, lawyers have faced discipline for
244
engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.
Discipline is
also possible for the attorney who engages in behavior having no sub245
stantial purpose other than to harass another.
A party seeking to bring such a claim, however, may run face-first
into the well-established rule of thumb that liability does not exist
246
under an IIED theory for mere insults and uncivil behavior.
One
author has suggested that the courts’ restrictive view of the IIED tort
developed because “the courts wanted to protect themselves from being overwhelmed with attempts to turn mere bad manners or petty
247
incivilities into court cases.”
Add to this the fact that many courts
view litigation as a “rough and tumble” process in which tempers often run high, and non-parties face a formidable task in attempting to
establish that a lawyer’s incivility amounts to extreme and outrageous
240

See Harris, supra note 109, at 568–70 (discussing decline of civility in the practice of law).
241
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Coe, 665 N.W.2d 849, 857 (Wis.
2003) (imposing discipline for incivility); Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyers Sanctioned for
E-Mail Insults, Including ‘Scum Sucking Loser’ Comment, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 3, 2011, 6:00 AM
CST),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_sanctioned_for_email_insults_including_scum_sucking_loser_comment (detailing discipline of two
lawyers “who called each other a ‘retard’ and ‘scum sucking loser’ in escalating email insults”).
242
Elliot L. Bien, Toward a Community of Professionalism, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
475, 478 (2001); Adam Owen Glist, Note, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the
Civility Movement, 69 FORDHAM L. REV 757, 757–58 (2000).
243
See Hannes v. Pechner, No. C042624, 2004 WL 937985, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 30, 2004) (involving IIED claim based on altercation in courthouse involving
opposing attorneys).
244
See In re Turner, 631 N.E.2d 918 (Ind. 1994) (involving lawyer who told a judge
that the judge ran a “Mickey Mouse court” and walked out of court); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) (2011) (prohibiting such conduct).
245
See In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Minn. 1987) (publicly reprimanding
lawyer for using means having no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
or burden a third person, including posing questions designed to degrade witness).
246
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
247
Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress in Fraud Cases: Dignitary Torts in
a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20 (1989).
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conduct. Thus, name-calling might potentially lead to professional
248
discipline, but it is unlikely to amount to extreme and outrageous
249
conduct for purposes of an IIED claim.
For example, in Haller v. Phillips, a lawyer representing a complainant in a criminal investigation allegedly telephoned the plaintiff
250
at home and called him a “son of a bitch.” An Ohio appellate court
observed that although the lawyer’s behavior was “rude and abusive,”
it was not “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as
251
to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Similarly, in Nestlerode
v Federal Insurance Co., a lawyer made several statements to the opposing party during a recess at trial that, in the court’s words, “were un252
fortunate and better left unsaid.” The “unfortunate” comments included the lawyer questioning whether the plaintiff realized how
much he had to lose in the lawsuit and that the lawyer was “going to
253
go all the way.” While the lawyer’s statements were certainly rude,
vaguely threatening, and probably in violation of the ethical rule
prohibiting communication with a represented party, they were not
254
so extreme as to be “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
2.

Debt Collection

Overly-aggressive debt collection attempts have generated any
255
number of legal claims. Consumer protection statutes may provide
256
a remedy for individuals who have been subject to such attempts.
Lawyers are not immune to such claims. In 2010, for example, the
Supreme Court held that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
248
See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Turgeon, 557 S.E.2d 235, 239 (W. Va. 2000) (involving lawyer who referred to other lawyer as a “coke dealer” in front of jury); see also
PROF.
BLOG
(Sept.
24,
2010),
Have
a
Nice
Day,
LEGAL
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2010/09/have-a-nice-day.html
(discussing disciplinary charges brought against an attorney who referred to another
attorney as a “piece of shit”).
249
See Keller v. Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D. Utah 1995)
(concluding that lawyer’s statement that he would crush opposing party “like a peanut” did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Ulmer v. Frisard, 694
So. 2d 1046, 1049 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that lawyer’s threat to “clean
[plaintiff’s] clock” did not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct).
250
591 N.E.2d 305, 306 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
251
Id. at 307.
252
414 N.Y.S.2d 398, 400 (App. Div. 1979).
253
Id. at 399.
254
Id. at 400.
255
See, e.g., Vanderbilt Mortg. & Finance, Inc. v. Flores, 746 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D.
Tex. 2010) (involving fraud and RICO claims).
256
See The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2006).
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which is designed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, does
not provide debt collectors and their attorneys with a good faith de257
fense to liability for misinterpretations of the law.
IIED claims remain another possibility. The Restatement (Second)
of Torts cites debt-collection attempts as a special situation in which
258
Even prior to the Restatement’s recogniIIED liability might arise.
tion of the IIED tort, several courts had allowed for recovery for pure259
ly emotional harms stemming from abusive collection tactics.
On
occasion, lawyers have faced IIED claims stemming from their attempts to collect a debt on behalf of a client and from a client.
a.

IIED Claims Stemming from Attempts to Collect a Debt
on Behalf of a Client

Lawyers, like other defendants, may potentially face liability for
attempting to collect a debt in a harassing or otherwise extreme
260
manner.
A comment to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that an individual does not face liability for asserting a
261
legal right in a permissible way. This is true even where the defen262
dant knows that emotional distress may occur.
But, where the attempt to collect debt involves harassment or other impermissible
263
means, liability remains a possibility.
257

Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1624
(2010).
258
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965); see also Fraker, supra note
7, at 990 (“One of the most prominent lines of cases in the evolution of IIED arose
from . . . the pressure tactics of humiliating debtors into repayment . . . .”).
259
Fraker, supra note 7, at 991.
260
See, e.g., Perk v. Worden, 475 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Va. 2007) (concluding
that plaintiff stated a claim where lawyer allegedly used abusive language and lied to
plaintiff in order to obtain a default judgment); Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre, 206 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1527 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that plaintiff had stated a
cause of action based on law firm’s attempts to collect a debt on behalf of client, including falsely telling plaintiff that there was a warrant out for her arrest); Champlin
v. Wash. Trust Co., 478 A.2d 985, 990 (R.I. 1984) (concluding that lawyer did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct in the absence of any finding of abusive or
threatening conduct).
261
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1977) (“The actor is never liable, for example, where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such insistence is certain to cause
emotional distress.”); see also Nelson v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 621 S.W.2d 573, 575–
76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that attempts to collect a debt, even in a rude
and insolent manner, are not extreme and outrageous conduct).
262
Champlin, 478 A.2d at 989.
263
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g, illus. 7 (1977) (providing an
example of an overly-aggressive form and actionable form of debt collection); see also
MacDermid v. Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 729 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding
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The few cases permitting plaintiffs to proceed on their IIED
claims stemming from a lawyer’s attempts to collect a debt on behalf
of a client have typically involved some combination of threats, falsehoods, and misuse of the judicial system. For example, a California
appellate court held in Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre that a
plaintiff had stated a claim when a law firm, in an attempt to collect a
debt on behalf of client, falsely told a seventy-four-year-old woman
that there was a bench warrant out for her arrest and that the firm
264
would not recall the warrant until the debt was paid in full. In Perk
v. Worden, a lawyer, seeking to collect a debt on behalf of a client,
“blatantly lied” to the plaintiff so that she would not appear for a
265
court hearing and he could obtain a default judgment against her.
In addition, the lawyer knowingly filed state actions against her in an
266
incorrect venue and was verbally abusive to her on the telephone.
According to the court, the plaintiff stated a claim for extreme and
267
outrageous conduct. Although both decisions are probably correct,
neither offers much in the way of explanation as to why the conduct
of the respective lawyers could be considered extreme and outrageous.
b.

IIED Claims Stemming from Attempts to Collect a Debt
from a Client

Lawyers have also faced IIED claims stemming from their aggres268
sive attempts to collect a fee from a former client. These cases involve the same complexities and uncertainties as the cases described
above, but with one additional wrinkle: the recipient of the threat in
these cases is a former client.
While the lawyer-client relationship may technically be over,
there remains at least some element of a special relationship in the
case of a lawyer and a former client. Although the same level of trust

that husband stated a claim for IIED based upon defendant’s attempts to collect a
debt that resulted in wife’s suicide); Bennett v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Con., 549
P.2d 393, 397 (Okla. Civ. App. 1976) (concluding plaintiff stated an IIED claim
based upon bank employee’s abusive telephone calls attempting to collect a debt).
264
206 Cal. App. 3d 1513, 1518–19 (Ct. App. 1988).
265
475 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (E.D. Va. 2007).
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
See, e.g., Moore v. Greene, 431 F.2d 584, 589 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying California law); Cummings v. Pinder, 574 A.2d 843, 845 (Del. 1990); Amstead v. McFarland,
650 S.E.2d 737, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); see also Miller v. Stonehenge/Fasa-Texas,
JDC, L.P., 993 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (involving IIED claim against attorney
based on attorney’s invasion of privacy of debtor’s possessions).
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may no longer exist, a client does not become a stranger—either as a
practical or a legal matter—when the lawyer-client relationship concludes. For example, a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality remains even
269
after the termination of the relationship.
In addition, a lawyer is
ethically prohibited from representing a new client in a matter that is
the same or substantially related to the matter in which the lawyer
270
formerly represented a client. The existence of special ethical obligations regarding former clients perhaps explains why courts have
been willing to allow IIED claims to proceed where they might not in
other instances.
For example, in an attempt to collect legal fees, the attorney in
Moore v. Greene, a decision from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
subjected a former client to “a barrage of offensive and insulting re271
marks unbecoming a sane human being” in a series of letters.
Among other remarks, the attorney warned that he would “flay” the
client and advised the client that if he was “too damn dumb to under272
stand what is said to you plainly, get smart.” The court concluded
that the statements satisfied the extreme and outrageous conduct
element of the client’s IIED claim, despite the general rule that in273
sults and threats do not rise to that level.
Although there is little
explanation from the court’s opinion as to why the insults and threats
in this case rose to that level, one can perhaps infer that the fact that
the insults and threats were directed at a former client may have influenced the decision.
As a general rule, an attorney is not liable under an IIED theory
for resorting to litigation in order to retain a fee, even where the fee
274
agreement is determined to be unenforceable.
But, prolonged
abuse of the legal process against a former client through the use of
vindictive and frivolous litigation has been found in at least one instance to rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct if the

269

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2011).
Id. R. 1.9(a).
271
Moore, 431 F.2d at 591.
272
Id. at 591 n.4.
273
Id. at 591.
274
See Margrabe v. Sexter & Warmflash, P.C., No. 07-CV-2798, 2009 WL 361830, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2009) (filing defamation action against client, allegedly in an
attempt to pressure client to drop a counterclaim against lawyer in a fee dispute, did
not rise to level of extreme and outrageous conduct); Amstead, 650 S.E.2d at 743
(concluding that lawyer’s resort to litigation to retain his attorney’s fee did not
amount to extreme and outrageous conduct).
270
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275

abuse is prolonged. The fact that the attorney’s “vindictive, obstreperous, and dilatory tactics” were directed toward a former client
seemed to influence the court’s view as to the reprehensibility of the
276
lawyer’s actions.
Cummings v. Pinder, a Delaware case, illustrates the sometimes
277
blurry line between a current client and a former client. The lawyer
in Cummings helped his client obtain a settlement in the underlying
278
matter. As part of a fee dispute, the lawyer caused a stop-payment
order on a check issued by the other side in the underlying matter
279
As a result, the client overdrew her
and endorsed to the client.
280
bank account and incurred bank charges. The client then sued on
281
an IIED theory. Although an attorney-client relationship probably
still existed as a technical matter at the time of the lawyer’s actions,
the lawyer had essentially performed the duties for which he had
been hired. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the jury
was justified in concluding these actions were extreme and outrageous in light of the fact that they arose from “a relationship of ‘trust
282
and confidence.’”
Another possible scenario involves the situation in which a lawyer threatens to disclose confidential client information in order to
collect a fee. There appear to be few reported IIED cases involving
this scenario. However, there have been several disciplinary actions
283
taken against lawyers for such action.
Given the breach of loyalty
such action would entail, it is easy to imagine a court classifying this
conduct as extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim.

275
See In re DuBarry, 814 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (La. 2002) (awarding damages in IIED
case stemming from lawyer’s use of “vindictive, obstreperous, and dilatory tactics” in
the course of a long fee dispute with a client); In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d 326 (La.
2000) (involving same case, but a different lawyer).
276
See In re DuBarry, 814 So. 2d at 1281 (“Most troubling is respondent’s exhibition of a complete indifference for the emotional distress inflicted on her client for a
decade.”).
277
574 A.2d 843 (Del. 1990).
278
Id. at 845.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
See Lindenbaum v. State Bar, 160 P.2d 9, 17 (Cal. 1945) (suspending lawyer for
six months); In re Huffman, 983 P.2d 534, 549 (Or. 1999) (suspending lawyer for
three years); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Boelter, 985 P.2d 328, 342 (Wash.
1999) (suspending lawyer for six months).
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3.

Threatening or Initiating Criminal Prosecution in
Order to Gain an Advantage in a Civil Matter

a.

Threatening or Initiating Criminal Prosecution in
Order to Gain an Advantage in a Civil Matter On
Behalf of a Client

One situation in which a lawyer’s debt collection attempts might
conceivably cross the line into extreme and outrageous conduct is
when a lawyer threatens a party with criminal prosecution in order to
284
obtain an advantage in a civil proceeding on behalf of a client.
Closely related is the situation in which a lawyer initiates or attempts
to initiate criminal proceedings against another in order to gain an
285
advantage on behalf of a client.
Both situations present difficult
challenges.
The legal profession has decidedly mixed views on whether
threatening criminal prosecution in order to attain an advantage in a
civil proceeding is beyond all bounds of accepted conduct for lawyers. Initially, the ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibited a lawyer from threatening to present criminal charges solely to
286
obtain an advantage in a civil matter. At least one court concluded
that a client who alleged a lawyer had violated this rule had stated a
287
However,
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
when the ABA replaced the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it omitted the prohibition on threatening criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a
288
civil proceeding. ABA Ethics Opinion 92-363 noted that the omission was deliberate and that such threats were permissible
provided that the criminal matter is related to the civil claim, the
lawyer has a well founded belief that both the civil claim and the
possible criminal charges are warranted by the law and the facts,

284

See, e.g., Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (Ct. App. 1977).
See, e.g., Kalika v. Stern, 911 F. Supp. 594, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
286
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105 (1980).
287
Kinnamon, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 321. Kinnamon’s reliance on the lawyer’s ethical
violation as supporting a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct, and its refusal
to extend the litigation privilege to the lawyer due to the ethical violation, have since
been the subject of repeated criticisms among California courts. See, e.g., Silberg v.
Anderson, 786 P.2d 365, 369 (Cal. 1990) (disapproving decisions refusing to extend
absolute privilege to such cases); Ross v. Creel Printing & Publ’g Co., 122 Cal. Rptr.
2d 787 (Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting the notion that violation of an ethical rule equates
to extreme and outrageous conduct).
288
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-363 (1992).
285

LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/2/2012 6:07 PM

LAWYERS INFLICTING EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

101

and the lawyer does not attempt to exert or suggest improper in289
fluence over the criminal process.

The opinion also noted, however, that if any of these preconditions were not met, the lawyer’s actions would likely violate one or
290
more separate ethics rules.
In addition, the opinion noted that a
lawyer’s threats could conceivably amount to extortion or compound291
Finally, despite the ABA’s decision to
ing under the criminal law.
omit the prohibition on threatening criminal prosecution when it
promulgated the Model Rules, a near majority of jurisdictions have
292
retained the prohibition.
Thus, it is possible to imagine a lawyer
who, in bad faith, threatens criminal prosecution in order to gain an
advantage in a civil matter facing professional discipline and an IIED
claim, regardless of whether a disciplinary rule specifically prohibited
such action. The fact that a lawyer violates a rule specifically prohibiting threats of criminal prosecution would seem to increase the likelihood of a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.
IIED cases involving a lawyer’s initiating or threatening to initiate criminal prosecution in order to obtain an advantage present a
particularly challenging issue. Courts have sometimes been willing to
recognize a nonlawyer’s threats of criminal prosecution in order to
coerce a more favorable settlement as rising to the level of extreme
293
and outrageous conduct. Similarly, some courts have been willing
to conclude that making false reports of criminal activity against an
294
individual may qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct, espe289

Id.
Id.
291
Id.
292
See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.10 (2010); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 5-100(A) (2010); COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5(A) (2010);
CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(7) (2010); D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
8.4(g) (2010); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(g) (2010); GA. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.4(h) (2010); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(i) (2010); IDAHO
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2010); ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(g)
(2010); KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f); LA. RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R.
8.4(g) (2010); ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(e) (2010); N.J. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.4(g) (2010); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2010); MASS.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(h) (2010); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.2(e) (2010); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5 (2010); TENN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2010); TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.04(b);
VT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.5 (2010); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(i)
(2010); WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(c) (2010).
293
FDIC v. S. Prawer & Co., 829 F. Supp. 439, 450 (D. Me. 1992).
294
See, e.g., Mroz v. Lee, 5 F.3d 1016, 1019–20 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying Michigan
law and concluding that defendant’s acts of falsely informing others that defendant
engaged in criminal activities and using this misinformation to manipulate the legal
system to plaintiff’s detriment could qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct).
290
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cially if done by an individual occupying a position of trust or author295
ity. The fact that a lawyer commits these acts only complicates the
analysis. On the one hand, the fact that it is a lawyer—an individual
with special responsibilities regarding the administration of justice—
who commits these acts arguably makes the acts more egregious. On
the other, a lawyer’s duty of diligent representation may cut against a
finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.
Generally, courts have come down on the diligent representation side of the conflict. When a lawyer, with probable cause, threatens criminal prosecution on behalf of a client, courts have been re296
luctant to classify such conduct as extreme and outrageous. At least
one court has held that the absolute litigation privilege applies to
297
such statements. But often there is little explanation as to how the
court arrived at its conclusion that these threats do not amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. Courts have sometimes shielded lawyers from IIED claims even where a lawyer is alleged to have knowingly made a false statement about the plaintiff to law enforcement
authorities. In a Pennsylvania case, a husband alleged that his wife’s
lawyer, in an attempt to gain an advantage in an anticipated child
custody proceeding, told police that the father had sexually molested
his own daughter and knew, or should have known, that the state298
ment was false. The court concluded, without explanation, that the
father’s IIED complaint could not withstand a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that the alleged conduct was not extreme and outra299
geous as a matter of law. The court reached this conclusion despite
295

See, e.g., Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 139 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(concluding that police officers’ acts of making false reports of criminal activity on
plaintiff’s part could qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965) (“[P]olice officers, school authorities, landlords, and collecting creditors have been held liable for extreme abuse of their position.”). But see Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 887, 891 (Ct. App. 1972)
(concluding that defendant’s false statements about plaintiff to authorities during
criminal investigation did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct),
overruled by 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
296
See, e.g., Burton v. NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 355 S.E.2d 800, 803 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1987) (concluding that a lawyer who, in attempting to collect a debt on behalf
of client, stated that client was considering filing criminal charges for the filing of an
inaccurate financial statement did not engage in extreme and outrageous conduct);
see also Kalika v. Stern, 911 F. Supp. 594, 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (concluding that lawyer’s act of pursuing criminal charges related to civil representation was not extreme
and outrageous conduct where lawyer had probable cause to believe there was a violation of law).
297
Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
298
Motheral v. Burkhart, 583 A.2d 1180, 1189–90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
299
Id. at 1190.
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the horrific nature of the false allegation and despite the fact that the
lawyer’s actions in the case, as alleged, could potentially have subjected the lawyer to significant disciplinary sanctions, including the
300
suspension of her license.
b.

Threatening Criminal Prosecution and Other
Aggressive Attempts to Collect a Fee from a Former
Client

A lawyer who threatens criminal prosecution in an attempt to
collect a fee might also potentially face an IIED claim. Although
there are few reported IIED cases involving this scenario, lawyers have
301
faced professional discipline for engaging in this behavior. The fact
that a lawyer has continuing ethical duties with respect to a former
client may increase the likelihood that the lawyer’s actions would be
found to be extreme and outrageous. For example, a lawyer who
threatens to disclose confidential information in order to obtain a
warrant for a client’s arrest in connection with a fee dispute has arguably engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct even absent an ethical rule specifically prohibiting a lawyer from threatening criminal
302
prosecution in order to obtain an advantage in a civil proceeding.
C. A Brief Summary
At least three themes emerge from the preceding study of IIED
cases involving lawyer-defendants. First, plaintiffs only occasionally
prevail. Second, despite plaintiffs’ general lack of success, results are
difficult to predict and clear standards as to what qualifies as extreme
and outrageous conduct on the part of an attorney are elusive. This
lack of predictability stems, at least in part, from the failure of courts
to articulate a meaningful standard for evaluating a lawyer’s misconduct. Third, despite this uncertainty, clients are more likely to be
300
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2011) (prohibiting a lawyer, in
the course of representing a client, from knowingly making a false statement of material fact); id. R. 4.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person); cf. Cuyahoga City Bar Ass’n v. Wise, 842 N.E.2d 35 (Ohio 2006) (suspending lawyer for six
months for threatening aunt with criminal prosecution for kidnapping in order to
gain advantage in a custody proceeding where lawyer admitted he never suspected
aunt of kidnapping). See generally Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct
v. Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1996) (disbarring lawyer for making false accusations of criminal conduct against judges and lawyers in court filings).
301
See, e.g., In re Yarborough, 488 S.E.2d 871, 874 (S.C. 1997).
302
Cf. People v. Farrant, 852 P.2d 452, 455 (Colo. 1993) (concluding that a lawyer’s threat to disclose confidential client information in connection with a fee dispute, standing alone, warranted suspension from the practice of law).
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successful on their IIED claims than are plaintiffs with no attorneyclient relationship with the defendant. This is generally consistent
with the outcomes in other IIED cases, in which plaintiffs with con303
tractual relationships with defendants are more likely to prevail.
These conclusions should not be surprising. As a matter of contract law, the existence of a contractual relationship imposes upon
304
the parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing. And as a matter of
tort law, courts could naturally be expected to infer from this a
somewhat heightened standard of decent behavior and fairness when
dealing with a contractual partner, the violation of which could more
305
readily be characterized as “extreme and outrageous.” In the case
of lawyers and their clients, there is not only a contractual relationship but a relationship built upon “the utmost trust and confi306
dence.”
In the case of lawyers and non-clients, the law governing
lawyers has gone to great lengths to limit any sense on the part of
non-clients that lawyers owe them any duty other than to refrain from
307
intentionally harming them. Many of the non-clients who sue lawyers for intentional infliction of emotional distress have an adversarial
relationship with the lawyers in question, lawyers who owe a duty of
zealous advocacy to their own clients. Accordingly, courts appear to
be inclined to require that a lawyer’s conduct be even more egregious
than the typical IIED defendant in order to satisfy the “extreme and
outrageous” element.
Nor is it terribly surprising that the area lacks clear standards
with regard to what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct on
the part of a lawyer. As discussed, IIED law is riddled with uncertain303

In 1982, Professor Daniel Givelber concluded:
When the parties have a pre-existing economic relationship based or
apparently based on contract, courts are frequently willing to uphold
determinations of outrageousness. These cases reflect a common
theme—they require a basic level of fair procedure and decency in
dealings between people who occupy unequal bargaining positions and
are bound (or apparently bound) by voluntary agreements. When the
parties are not bound by contract, the cases are fewer, the results more
unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent.
Givelber, supra note 6, at 63.
304
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
305
See Givelber, supra note 6, at 63 (noting that, in the case of parties with contractual relationships, the cases “require a basic level of fair procedure and decency”).
306
Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y. 1981).
307
See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text; see also Yorgan v. Durkin, 715
N.W.2d 160, 166–67 (Wis. 2006) (“[A]bsent fraud or certain policy considerations,
an attorney is not liable to third parties for acts committed in the exercise of his duties as an attorney.”).
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ty and vague standards. The complexities involved in lawyer IIED
cases only exacerbate the problem. What is at least mildly surprising
(and certainly disappointing) is the failure of courts to articulate any
meaningful standards with regard to the extreme and outrageous determination. In light of the wealth of positive law and clear policy
pronouncements concerning proper behavior on the part of lawyers,
courts have at least some tools at their disposal to develop such standards. Regrettably, the courts have largely failed to take advantage of
them.
V. A NEW APPROACH TO LAWYER IIED CASES
As the foregoing discussion should illustrate, courts often engage in exceptionally rigorous scrutiny of the alleged outrageousness
of a lawyer’s conduct in IIED cases. However, the standards that
courts apply in these cases are far from clear. If courts are going to
engage in this type of close scrutiny, they should be clearer about to
what standard a defendant’s conduct is being compared.
Disciplinary rules establish standards of conduct and duties that
lawyers owe to their clients. Therefore, the fact that a lawyer’s conduct amounts to a violation of a disciplinary rule should be a relevant
consideration in the outrageousness analysis. However, for the reasons discussed previously, the mere violation of a disciplinary rule is
308
not always a reliable indicator of outrageousness. Courts should also look to positive expressions of the policies underlying the disciplinary and legal rules governing lawyers’ conduct in an attempt to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct may qualify as “extreme and
outrageous.” But, as discussed previously, even this approach may
309
sometimes lead to contradictory or incomplete conclusions.
Although a completely satisfactory definition of “extreme and outrageous” conduct will probably always remain outside the reach of
courts, when external standards exist that may aid in the determination, they should be utilized. The following Part argues how, in addition to relying on disciplinary rules and the policy values underlying
the law governing lawyers, courts may use the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“Standards”) and prior disciplinary decisions to
help determine whether a lawyer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous.

308
309

See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
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A. Extreme and Outrageous Conduct and the Sanction of Disbarment
310

Disbarment is the ultimate professional sanction for a lawyer.
In deciding whether disbarment is the appropriate sanction for professional misconduct, courts and disciplinary authorities frequently
note the purpose of professional discipline is not primarily to punish
an offending attorney. Instead, professional discipline serves the
goals of “protecting the public, maintaining public confidence in the
bar, preserving the integrity of the legal profession, and preventing
311
similar conduct in the future.” Accordingly, disbarment is only appropriate in the most serious cases—those cases in which an attor312
ney’s continued practice threatens those goals.
In describing what conduct merits the ultimate sanction of disbarment, courts and disciplinary authorities have used a variety of descriptive terms. Many of these terms would sound quite at home in
the context of a decision involving a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Courts have stated that disbarment is reserved for
313
314
315
“extreme” misconduct, “outrageous” conduct, “atrocious acts,”
conduct that puts an attorney “beyond the bounds of what the . . . le316
gal community expects of its members” or that represents a “a wide

310

In re Morse, 7 A.3d 1259, 1266 (N.H. 2010).
Id.; see also In re Torres, No. 96–O–04035, 2000 WL 282930, at *12 (Cal. Bar Ct.
Mar. 7, 2000) (“[T]he primary purposes of discipline are to protect the public, the
courts, and the legal profession; to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.”).
312
See In re Sniadecki, 924 N.E.2d 109, 120 (Ind. 2010) (“Disbarment is reserved
for the most serious misconduct.”).
313
In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396, 412 n.15 (D.C. 2006) (referring to disbarred lawyer’s misconduct as “extreme”); In re Disciplinary Action Against Kaszynski,
620 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. 2001) (stating that “extreme client neglect and noncommunication” may warrant disbarment); In re Imbriani, 694 A.2d 1030, 1033 (N.J.
1997) (concluding that disbarment was appropriate given finding that lawyer’s misconduct was “extreme and extended”); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Tasker,
9 P.3d 822, 832 (Wash. 2000) (concluding that disbarment was the appropriate sanction “given the extreme nature of the misconduct”).
314
In re Welcker, 701 So. 2d 186, 188 (La. 1997) (permanently disbarring attorney
based on finding of “outrageous, inexcusable and contemptible” behavior); In re
Breen, 552 A.2d 105, 116 (N.J. 1989) (concluding that lawyer’s “outrageous conduct”
warranted disbarment); Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Al’Uqdah, 792 N.E.2d 1074, 1077
(Ohio 2003) (disbarring attorney based on lawyer’s “outrageous pattern of misconduct”); In re Adams, 534 S.E.2d 278, 281 (S.C. 2000) (disbarring attorney based on
“outrageous pattern of misappropriation”).
315
In re X, 577 A.2d 139, 140 (N.J. 1990) (“[R]espondent’s atrocious acts justify
his disbarment.”).
316
Mississippi Bar v. Sweeney, 849 So. 2d 884, 890 (Miss. 2003) (Cobb, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311
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317

departure” from the expectations of the legal profession, “the most
318
319
egregious misconduct,” “intolerable conduct,” and conduct that
manifests a willingness to violate “common decency” in pursuit of the
320
lawyer’s goals. Summing up the decisional law about as well as one
could hope for, one court has stated that “[t]he common thread that
runs through cases resulting in disbarment is that the conduct is so
offensive and obnoxious both to common decency and to principles
321
of justice that there can be no other result.”
Tort law and the lawyer disciplinary process serve different purposes. However, the rationales underlying the standards of “extreme
and outrageous” conduct and conduct warranting disbarment are the
same. Both standards address conduct that cannot be tolerated if society is to function. Lawyers play a fundamental role in the adminis322
tration of justice.
As the Ohio Supreme Court noted while ordering the disbarment of a lawyer, “[a] civilized society cannot long
remain without implicit confidence in those who occupy responsible
positions of public trust, including . . . members of the Bar who are
323
‘officers of the court.’”
Therefore, conduct that warrants disbarment is conduct that the legal profession and society more generally
cannot tolerate if its legal institutions are to function. It is conduct
that is intolerable in a civilized society. Stated differently, it is extreme and outrageous conduct.
317
Commonwealth ex rel. Pike Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Stump, 57 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Ky.
1933); see also In re Goldstein, 104 N.E.2d 227, 230 (Ill. 1952) (Schaefer, J., dissenting) (opining that disbarment is appropriate where attorney engages in “a wide departure from the standards required of members of the legal profession”).
318
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 891 N.E.2d 324, 340 (Ohio 2008); see also Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Coleman, 639 S.E.2d 882, 892 (W. Va. 2006) (“[D]isbarment is
a sanction reserved for only the most egregious of disciplinary proceedings.”).
319
In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d 496, 510–11 (N.J. 2010) (LaVecchia, J., dissenting)
(stating that the disbarment was an appropriate sanction for an attorney’s “intolerable” misconduct); see also Fla. Bar v. Dove, 985 So. 2d 1001, 1019 (Fla. 2008) (stating
that disbarment is appropriate for “intolerable acts of deception”); In re Morris, 241
S.E.2d 911, 913 (S.C. 1978) (concluding that the lawyer’s “disregard of his clients’
interest in favor of his own is intolerable” and that disbarment was, therefore, appropriate).
320
In re Hirschfeld, 960 P.2d 640, 644 (Ariz. 1998); see also Copren v. State Bar,
183 P.2d 833, 841–42 (Nev. 1947) (stating that disbarment is appropriate where necessary “to promote the maintenance of the proper decency . . . in the legal profession”).
321
In re Vincenti, 704 A.2d 927, 942–43 (N.J. 1998).
322
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2011) (“[A lawyer is] “a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).
323
Cleveland Bar Ass’n v. Fatica, 274 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Ohio 1971); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 13 (2011) (“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society.”)
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The California State Bar Court (the court charged with ruling
on disciplinary cases) has drawn a similar connection between extreme and outrageous conduct in the IIED context and conduct warranting disbarment. In re Torres was a disciplinary case involving an
attorney who engaged in an extended pattern of harassment against a
client, including making over one hundred telephone calls to the
324
client’s house, often late at night.
In considering the appropriate
discipline for the lawyer’s misconduct, the court relied heavily on the
fact that the client had successfully sued the lawyer on an intentional
325
infliction of emotional distress theory for the same conduct.
Ultimately, in the court’s view, what made the conduct intolerable was
the fact that it was committed by a lawyer.
It is also important to note the depravity of this misconduct in its
relation to the legal profession. Here is a lawyer that turns on his
client, without provocation, through a pattern of harassment and
the intentional infliction of serious emotional distress for the
purpose of causing the client grief. Such duplicitous conduct by a
lawyer makes the legal profession not a highly essential aid to so326
ciety, but a detriment.

According to the California Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, the presumptive discipline in such cases is actual
327
suspension or disbarment.
B. The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions and IIED
Claims
The goal of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions is to
328
establish clear and appropriate standards of professional discipline.
324

No. 96–O–04035, 2000 WL 282930, at *3 (Cal. Bar Ct. Mar. 7, 2000).
Id. at *6–7.
326
Id. at *11.
327
Id. at *12. The court imposed a sanction of three years’ actual suspension with
a condition that the lawyer undergo mental health counseling. Id. at *14. The court
rejected (incorrectly, I would argue) the sanction of disbarment suggested by the
hearing officer on the grounds that the lawyer’s conduct was not as bad as similar
conduct on the part of other lawyers that had resulted in disbarment, and the lawyer
did not display a “total lack of remorse.” Id. at *13 (emphasis in original). Neither of
these seem like particularly strong reasons to allow a lawyer who terrorized his client
to the point that she became so emotionally unstable that she lost her job to continue to practice. Id. at *10.
328
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 1.3 (1992); Moore, supra
note 74, at 18. The ABA has also produced the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, which are less specific than the Standards and which “address the lawyer
disciplinary process holistically.” Jennifer Carpenter & Thomas Cluderay, Implications
of Online Disciplinary Records: Balancing the Public’s Interest In Openness with Attorneys’
Concerns for Maintaining Flexible Self-Regulation, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 735 n.14
325
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329

Most states have adopted the Standards.
While state courts vary in
terms of how frequently or rigorously they actually apply the Stan330
dards in practice, the Standards have become well established since
their publication in 1986.
The Standards provide courts and disciplinary authorities with
guidance in determining the appropriate sanction after a lawyer has
been found to have engaged in a violation of a disciplinary rule. In
devising the Standards, the authors collected data regarding “what
types of sanctions have been imposed for similar misconduct in re331
ported cases.” Thus, to some extent, the Standards reflect the legal
profession’s collective judgment concerning the seriousness of different types of misconduct. The Standards also adopt what one author
332
has described as a two-tiered analysis to the issue of sanctions. According to the Preface, when assessing the appropriate sanction, a
disciplinary authority should look “first at the ethical duty and to
whom it is owed, and then at the lawyer’s mental state and the
333
amount of injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct.”
According to the authors’ description of the analytical framework, “[i]n determining the nature of the ethical duty violated, the
standards assume that the most important ethical duties are those ob334
ligations which a lawyer owes to clients.”
Thus, in general, a violation of an ethical duty owed to a client is more likely to lead to serious disciplinary sanctions than a violation of a duty owed to the
335
public, the legal system, or the legal profession. Examples of duties
owed to clients include the duty of loyalty (including preserving
client property, maintaining client confidences, and avoiding con-

(2009). Because one of the premises of this Article is that greater clarity and specificity is needed in the IIED context, the Standards provide a more useable standard.
329
See Rachna K. Dhanda, Note, When Attorneys Become Convicted Felons: The Question
of Discipline by the Bar, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 723, 731 n.53 (1995) (stating that with
the exceptions of New York, the District of Columbia, and Mississippi, virtually every
jurisdiction has “substantially adopted provisions of the Standards”).
330
See, e.g., In re LaMartina, 38 So. 3d 266, 271 (La. 2010) (explicitly referencing
and applying the Standards); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Allison, 284 S.W.3d 316,
327 (Tenn. 2009) (same); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Preszler, 232 P.3d
1118, 1126 (Wash. 2010) (same).
331
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface, at 3 (1986).
332
Rachel Tarko Hudson, Pick Your Poison: Abuse of Legal Versus Illegal Substances as
Mitigation in Attorney Discipline Cases, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 913 (2009).
333
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface, at 3 (1986).
334
Id. at 9.
335
See generally id. (explaining that in considering the nature of the ethical duty
violated, one must inquire whether the duty was owed to the client, the public, the
legal system, or the profession).
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flicts of interest), the duty of diligence, the duty of competence, and
336
the duty of candor. Dishonest conduct could be a violation of a duty owed to the clients, the public, the legal system, or the legal profes337
sion, depending upon to whom the misrepresentation is directed.
The next step in the analysis is to determine the lawyer’s mental
state and the amount of injury caused by the misconduct. Not surprisingly, the Standards explain that “[t]he most culpable mental state is
338
that of intent.” In determining the appropriate sanction for a violation of a disciplinary rule, one must also consider the extent of the
actual or potential injury the lawyer’s misconduct caused, with op339
tions ranging from “little or no injury” to “serious injury.” Finally,
the Standards suggest consideration of any aggravating or mitigating
factors, such as a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct,
340
the vulnerability of the victim, or illegal conduct.
The Standards then apply this framework to various ethical
breaches and lay out the presumptive sanction in each instance. For
example, the failure to preserve a client’s property is a breach of duty
341
to the client—the most serious type of breach.
As a result,
“[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a
342
client.”
Courts can easily apply the general analytical framework of the
Standards to IIED cases involving lawyers. In some respects, the Standards already reflect the general approach of courts in IIED cases involving lawyers. Lawyer misconduct directed at a client is considered
343
the most serious type of disciplinary offense under the Standards.
Due to the relationship of trust between lawyer and client, such misconduct is also more likely to amount to extreme and outrageous
conduct than misconduct directed at a non-client. Disbarment is
more likely under the Standards where a lawyer acts with intent and
336

Id. at 5.
Id.
338
Id. at 6.
339
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 6 (1986). The standards define
“potential injury” as harm “that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s
misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably
have resulted from the lawyer’s misconduct.” Id. at 7.
340
Id. at 11 & Standard 9.
341
See supra note 334 and accompanying text.
342
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.11 (1986).
343
See id. at 5 (“In determining the nature of the ethical duty violated, the standards assume that the most important ethical duties are those obligations which a
lawyer owes to clients.”).
337
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serious injury results. Similarly, the IIED tort requires either intent
or recklessness and “serious injury” in the form of severe emotional
distress.
Application of the Standards to lawyer IIED cases would add
something new to the existing approach to evaluating IIED claims.
The Standards provide more concrete analytical standards by classifying various forms of attorney misconduct and assessing the seriousness of each. The Standards also make value judgments regarding the
seriousness (or outrageousness) of a lawyer’s misconduct, based upon
prior decisional law. These judgments as to which offenses are particularly egregious may be particularly relevant for courts seeking to
assess the outrageousness of a lawyer’s misconduct. Thus, for example, the Standards explain that disbarment is generally appropriate in
the case of intentional conversion of client property that leads to in344
jury.
Notably, the Standards make a value judgment about the seriousness of this type of misconduct by only requiring “injury” rather
than “serious injury” as it does in most other cases before concluding
that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. This approach provides
a level of specificity and concreteness lacking in IIED cases.
In addition, the Standards reflect the common-sense notion that
the offensiveness or outrageousness of an action may be heightened
by the injury or potential injury that the actor’s conduct causes. For
instance, a lawyer who abandons her practice without notice to the
client, thereby leaving the client with no legal remedy, has caused serious injury. The Standards make clear that disbarment is appropriate
345
in such a case. Outside the disciplinary context, courts have been
more willing to overlook their traditional reluctance to permit emotional distress damages when a defendant’s conduct results in harm
or potential harm that is especially likely to produce emotional distress. For example, while emotional distress damages are typically not
available in a breach of contract action, the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts provides that emotional distress damages are permissible
when “the contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emo346
tional disturbance was a particularly likely result”
This is true for the tort law governing lawyers as well. For instance, while many courts are unwilling to allow recovery for emotional distress damages in malpractice actions, an exception often exists when a client is incarcerated or endures a similar loss of liberty as

344
345
346

STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.11 (1986).
Id. Standard 4.41(a).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (1981).
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347

a result of a lawyer’s malpractice. Similarly, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts notes that the fact that a defendant knows that an individual is
particularly susceptible to emotional distress is a factor that may lead
348
to a finding of outrageousness.
Thus, in many instances, a defendant’s conduct is extreme and outrageous because it was committed
with full knowledge that it could lead to serious injury, which in turn
could be expected to result in severe emotional distress. The Standards reflect this approach in directing courts and disciplinary authorities to consider the harm or potential harm caused by a lawyer’s
misconduct.
Thus, the standards for extreme and outrageous conduct on the
part of a lawyer for purposes of an IIED claim and the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions should be coterminous. In making the initial determination as to whether a lawyer’s conduct was sufficiently
egregious to submit the issue of outrageousness to the jury or to qualify as extreme and outrageous as a matter of law (in those jurisdictions where this is a question of law), courts should rely on the Standards. If disbarment is the presumptive sanction for the lawyer’s
misconduct under the Standards, a court should submit the case to
the jury (assuming there are triable issues regarding the other elements of the IIED claim) with the instruction that the jury may draw
an inference of outrageousness from the fact that the lawyer’s conduct satisfies the disbarment threshold. Where the question of outrageousness is one for the court, a court should, in the absence of any
mitigating circumstances, conclude that a lawyer’s misconduct is extreme and outrageous when disbarment is the presumptive sanction
349
for the misconduct.
A jurisdiction’s prior disciplinary decisions may also aid in the
extreme and outrageous analysis. One of the purposes of the disciplinary process is to educate other lawyers, thereby deterring future
350
misconduct. Thus, existing disciplinary decisions may serve to put
lawyers on notice as to the permissible bounds of conduct. Where
prior disciplinary decisions have established clear markers of conduct
347

E.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 222 (1st Cir. 1987); 3 MALLEN &
SMITH, supra note 9, § 21:11, at 38.
348
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965).
349
Under this approach, if a disciplinary proceeding has already been completed,
the fact that a lawyer has been found to have violated a rule or that the sanction of
disbarment has been recommended or imposed would have whatever evidentiary effect the jurisdiction gives to such evidence in other contexts. Thus, a prior disciplinary decision would not necessarily have any automatic effect on the plaintiff’s tort
claim against the lawyer.
350
See STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 1.1 cmt. (1986).
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that crosses the line into conduct “so offensive and obnoxious both to
common decency and to principles of justice” that disbarment is presumptively appropriate, courts should rely upon them in deciding
whether conduct qualifies as extreme and outrageous. By linking the
outrageousness and disbarment standards, courts can draw upon the
wealth of disciplinary decisions and draw more meaningful comparisons between conduct. Courts would not be limited to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts’ vague “beyond all possible bounds of decency” standard, nor would they be forced to draw comparisons between a lawyer’s conduct and that of a doctor, a teacher, or business person in
IIED cases. Instead, in assessing whether a lawyer’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, courts could compare apples to apples.
One admitted weakness of this approach is that sometimes disciplinary authorities and courts do not impose the sanction of dis351
barment when the Standards would seem to call for this result.
352
While disbarment should be rare,
it is perhaps even rarer than it
353
should be.
Thus, there are undoubtedly numerous situations in
which the bar has been set so high in the disciplinary context that a
finding of extreme and outrageous conduct would be unlikely if
354
courts simply compared the conduct of the lawyers in question. In
351

See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
See generally Roger W. Badeker, Struck Off: The Path to Disbarment, 64 J. KAN. B.A.
24, 26 (1995) (“[D]isbarment is a rare sanction.”).
353
Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned: The Failure of Attorney Self-Regulation in
the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 345 (2005) (referring to the D.C.
Board of Professional Responsibility’s “institutional reluctance to impose disbarment
in cases where the client has been subjected to gross mistreatment”).
354
See, e.g., In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d 326 (La. 2000) (involving a lawyer who, over
the course of ten years, engaged in vindictive and dilatory behavior in a fee dispute
with a client and who, by his own admission, falsely countersued the client for attorney’s fees not owed); see also In re DuBerry, 814 So. 2d 1273, 1276 (La. 2002) (involving same case). In prolonging the litigation, the lawyer misled the client to believe
that she could lose all of the proceeds she had previously received. Id. at 1281. As a
result, the client was afraid to spend any of the proceeds, despite the fact that “she
was, at times, in dire need of the funds.” Id. None of the attorney’s numerous counter actions were deemed meritorious. Id. at 1276. A lower court found the lawyer
liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on the lawyer’s abuse of
the legal process and knowledge of the former client’s vulnerability. Id. In the disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer, the disciplinary board concluded that in addition to violating his duties to the public and the legal system, the lawyer had violated his duty to his client, In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d at 331–32, the most serious type
of infraction. The board concluded that disbarment was the baseline sanction for
the lawyer’s misconduct, based on the fact that the lawyer’s actions “were knowing
and intentional, and caused a great amount of actual injury.” Id. at 331; cf.
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.2 Commentary (1986) (stating that disbarment is appropriate where a lawyer intentionally misuses the legal
process “to benefit the lawyer or another when the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or
352

LONG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

114

2/2/2012 6:07 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:55

addition, sometimes lesser sanctions are imposed due to the presence
of mitigating factors that may not be present in other cases. Thus, to
the extent there is a conflict between the proper presumptive result
stemming from an application of the Standards and prior results in
disciplinary cases, application of the Standards should prevail.
C. Applying the Approach to Lawyer IIED Cases
Regardless of whether courts formally put lawyer IIED cases and
lawyer disciplinary cases on the same analytical track in terms of judging the outrageousness of a lawyer’s conduct, utilizing aspects of the
approach of the Standards would be beneficial. It would certainly
help provide needed doctrinal clarity in the area. The following sec355
tion examines how the approach might work in practice.
1.

Liability to Clients

a.

Incompetence and Lack of Diligence

The Standards impose a high standard for disbarment in the case
of mere incompetence. According to Standard 4.51, absent aggravating circumstances, “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not unpotentially serious injury to a party”). Indeed, the board was unable to find “any
prior case dealing with ‘such egregious conduct.’” In re Boydell, 760 So. 2d at 331.
Yet, the lawyer had no prior disciplinary record, so the board concluded that this mitigating factor warranted a reduction in the sanction imposed to suspension for three
years. Id. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court approved the recommended
sanction, despite its conclusion that “[a] review of the jurisprudence of this state indicates there are no decisions involving vexatious litigation rising to the magnitude
of that perpetuated by respondent” and that the baseline sanction for similar misconduct in other jurisdictions was disbarment. Id. at 332. In addition to the lawyer’s
lack of a prior record, the court noted that the lawyer had cooperated with the disciplinary process (which, of course, he was ethically required to do anyway) and had
been subject to significant monetary sanctions. Id. Yet, a quick glance at the Standards reveals at least five relevant aggravating factors: the lawyer’s dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, vulnerability of the victim, and
substantial experience in the practice of law. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS Standard 9.22 (1986). Thus, one has difficulty imagining what it would
take for a first-time offender to be disbarred in Louisiana for abusing the legal
process as part of a fee dispute with a client.
355
Although not addressed in this Article, potential IIED claims might also exist
based on other forms of misconduct, such as a lawyer’s conversion of client property,
see STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.11 (1986) (“Disbarment is
generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes
injury or potential injury to a client.”), and dishonesty or fraud directed at a client,
id. Standard 4.61 (“Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious
injury or potentially serious injury to a client.”).
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derstand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and
356
the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client.”
While it is possible to imagine a scenario in which a lawyer acts recklessly by undertaking action in full awareness of the fact that the lawyer does not understand “the most basic fundamental legal doctrines
or procedures,” such cases are likely to be rare.
The standard for disbarment on the basis of lack of diligence is
decidedly lower. Absent aggravating circumstances, disbarment is
generally appropriate when “a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
357
client.” Violation of this standard should likewise amount to prima
facie evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct.
A lawyer’s duty of diligent representation is one of the funda358
mental values of the legal profession. A lawyer who knowingly fails
to act on behalf of a client has violated the trust of that client, and,
simultaneously, engaged in an extreme departure from the standards
of the profession. Where that action causes serious or potentially se359
rious injury to the client (such as imprisonment), the lawyer’s violation is compounded. Accordingly, “outrageous” is hardly too strong a
term to describe the lawyer’s conduct in such instances.
b.

Demands for Sexual Favors

A lawyer who attempts to persuade a client to enter into a sexfor-services arrangement has engaged in a violation of a duty to a
client, the most serious type of ethical breach. Courts have characterized such action in a variety of ways; however, the common thread is
that the conduct amounts to a violation of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.
In disciplining lawyers for this sort of behavior, courts have concluded that sexual harassment of a client amounts to creating a conflict of interest: a lawyer who harasses a client in this manner places
356

Id. Standard 4.51.
Id. Standard 4.41(b). Suspension is appropriate where the lawyer knowingly
fails to perform services but the injury to the client is less severe. Id. Standard
4.42(a); see also In re Johnson, 444 N.E.2d 153, 155 (Ill. 1982) (suspending lawyer who
failed to enter a divorce decree for over three years). See generally Clemencia v. Mitchell, 956 A.2d 76, 80 (D.C. 2008) (“[W]e have held that where an attorney’s neglectful failure . . . in handling a client’s case . . . amount[s] to conduct outrageously
in violation of . . . [the attorney’s] implicit duty to devote reasonable efforts in
representing his client, it may warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”) (internal quotations omitted).
358
See, e.g., Fred Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1315–18 (1995).
359
See Bowman v. Doherty, 686 P.2d 112 (Kan. 1984); supra notes 145–54 and accompanying text.
357
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“his own prurient interests above those of his clients.” In addition,
a lawyer who uses the threat of abandoning a client unless the client
consents to a sexual relationship may also violate a lawyer’s duty of
diligence by failing to provide due notice to a client and failing to
361
protect a client’s interests upon withdrawing from representation.
In the process, the lawyer’s multiple violations of professional responsibility may jeopardize the client’s interests, thereby creating the potential for serious injury. Disbarment in these kinds of cases is not
362
uncommon. Accordingly, such conduct should ordinarily qualify as
extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim.
c.

Permitting or Concealing Conflicts of Interest and
Other Breaches of Loyalty

i.

Conflicts of Interest

Standard 4.31 addresses when disbarment is appropriate based
upon a lawyer’s conflict of interest. In the case of a lawyer with a conflict of interest involving a current client, disbarment is generally appropriate when the lawyer knows of the conflict, continues the representation with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes
363
serious or potentially serious injury to a client. In the case of a conflict involving a former client, disbarment is generally appropriate
when the lawyer “knowingly uses information relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another,
364
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.”
Again, the bar for disbarment is set high in the case of permitting conflicts of interest. A lawyer must knowingly betray a client’s
trust for the benefit of the lawyer or another and the betrayal must
result in serious or potentially serious injury. This is most likely to be
360
In re Witherspoon, 3 A.3d 496, 500 (N.J. 2010); see also In re Piatt, 951 P.2d 889,
891 (Ariz. 1997) (stating that such conduct amounts to a conflict of interest because
the lawyer’s action “serves the lawyer’s interest and not the client’s”).
361
See In re Estate of Brandon, 902 P.2d 1299, 1318 n.21 (Alaska 1995); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(d) (2011); STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER
SANCTIONS Standard 4.51(a) (1986).
362
See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McGrath, 713
N.W.2d 682, 703–04 (Iowa 2006) (indefinitely suspending lawyer for engaging in
“sex-for-fees arrangement”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, 849 A.2d 423,
451 (Md. 2004) (disbarring attorney for, inter alia, threatening to withdraw from representation unless consented to sexual contact); see also Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Hall, 969 A.2d 953, 970 (Md. 2009) (suspending indefinitely attorney
who engaged in sexual relationship with client knowing her fragile emotional state).
363
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.31 (1986).
364
Id.
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the case where a lawyer “exploit[s] the lawyer-client relationship by
acquiring an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client without the client’s understanding or con365
sent.” In light of the fundamental role that the duty of loyalty plays
in the practice of law, conduct satisfying ABA Standard 4.31 should
ordinarily qualify as extreme and outrageous.
ii.

Other Breaches of Loyalty

Some of the other previously-discussed examples of breaches of
loyalty—such as lying to clients or refusing to allow a client to set366
tle —that have led to IIED claims actually involve a breach of the
duty of diligence as well as a breach of loyalty. For example, the
Standards treat a lawyer’s breach of the duty of proper communica367
tion with a client as a violation of the duty of diligence. As honesty
is also an essential component of a lawyer’s fiduciary duty to a client,
368
both duties are implicated when a lawyer lies to a client. Depending on the seriousness of the injury caused or risked, it is conceivable
that lying to a client could amount to extreme and outrageous con369
duct.
Consideration of the sanctions imposed in similar disciplinary cases may also aid a court in making this determination in close
370
cases.
These kinds of scenarios also illustrate how courts can rely on
the policies underlying the law governing lawyers to aid in the extreme and outrageousness determination. For example, clients have

365

Id. Standard 4.3 Commentary (noting that it is rare that an attorney knowingly
uses information relating to representation of a former client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client).
366
See, e.g., Green v. Leibowitz, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146 (App. Div. 1979); see also Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962 (5th Cir. 1970); supra notes 196–204 and accompanying text.
367
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 9 (1986).
368
See In re Brousseau, 697 A.2d 1079, 1080 (R.I. 1997) (concluding that lawyer
who lied to client about status of claim violated duties of diligence and communication and stating that “[a]n attorney who intentionally lies to the client about the status of the client’s claim violates his fiduciary duty of honesty to the client”).
369
Cf. STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.61 (1986) (“Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the
intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential serious
injury to a client.”).
370
Cf. Fla. Bar v. Fredericks, 731 So. 2d 1249, 1254 (Fla. 1999) (suspending lawyer
who lied to client about status of matter); In re Mays, 495 S.E.2d 30, 31 (Ga. 1998)
(disbarring lawyer with prior disciplinary history who allowed statute of limitations to
run and lied to client about status).
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an absolute right to decide whether to settle a matter. A provision
in a fee agreement that seeks to limit that right may be declared un372
enforceable in violation of public policy.
Given the importance
that the law governing lawyers attaches to a client’s right to settle, it is
not surprising that courts have sometimes imposed significant disciplinary sanctions against lawyers who have sought to deny clients that
373
right. Where a lawyer’s refusal to permit a client to settle is coupled
with other forms of misconduct and causes or risks serious injury, a
reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the lawyer’s conduct is
extreme and outrageous.
d. Disclosure of Confidential Information
Standard 4.2 deals with the failure to preserve a client’s confidences. The standard focuses on whether the lawyer discloses confidential information for the lawyer’s own benefit and whether the
client was injured or put at risk of injury by the disclosure: “Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals information relating to
representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a
374
client.” Again, given the fundamental role that client confidentiality plays in the practice of law, “extreme and outrageous” is hardly too
strong a term to describe a lawyer’s actions that satisfy ABA Standard
4.2.
In addition, this is a situation in which the rules of professional
conduct and the expressions of policy underlying the law governing
lawyers may provide courts with meaningful guidance in difficult cases. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and various state codes
contain clear statements of policy as to the fundamental importance
375
of maintaining client confidences.
Courts view the duty of confi376
dentiality as being essential to the administration of justice. Moreover, Model Rule 1.6 and its state equivalents delineate with some pre371

E.g., Barnes v. Quigley, 49 A.2d 467, 468 (D.C. 1946); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2011).
372
Long, supra note 45, at 312.
373
See, e.g., In re Lansky, 678 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (Ind. 1997) (suspending lawyer
who included a provision in fee agreement that limited client’s right to settle); In re
Wysolmerski, 702 A.2d 73, 75 (Vt. 1997) (suspending lawyer who settled matter without client’s permission).
374
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 4.21 (1986).
375
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2011).
376
See, e.g., Port of Portland v. Or. Ctr. for Envtl. Health, 243 P.3d 102, 106 (Or.
Ct. App. 2010).
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377

cision the scope of permissible disclosure.
Model Rule 1.6(a) is
clear that a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality applies not just to privileged information but to all information relating to the representa378
tion of a client.
Model Rule 1.6(b) lists the various exceptions to
379
that duty. Given the importance the legal profession and the public
attach to a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality and the potential harm
that may result to a client due to a breach, a court may be justified in
concluding that an intentional violation of this duty might amount to
extreme and outrageous conduct.
2.

Liability to Non-Clients

Under the approach described in this Article, analysis of a nonclient’s IIED claim against a lawyer would proceed in essentially the
same manner as that discussed in the preceding section. The Standards treat lawyer misconduct involving breach of a duty to a nonclient as presumptively less serious than misconduct involving
380
clients.
Accordingly, disbarment and findings that a lawyer’s conduct is extreme and outrageous for purposes of an IIED claim should
be uncommon in such cases.
In the case of litigation-related misconduct, reliance on the
Standards may be especially helpful insofar as the Standards already
take into account what weight the policy of zealous advocacy should
carry in establishing appropriate sanctions for misconduct. Thus,
courts would not be limited to high-level, abstract discussions of how
to balance the goals of zealous advocacy and civility and respect for
the legal process in considering the appropriate discipline.
Courts and disciplinary authorities have generally only imposed
the ultimate sanction of disbarment for litigation-related misconduct
when a lawyer has abused the legal process through a pattern of filing
381
frivolous motions or subverted the trial process by attempting to
377

See generally Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 534 (Or.
1985) (noting the use of professional standards to establish the fiduciary’s duty of
confidentiality).
378
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011).
379
Id. R. 1.6(b).
380
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Preface (1986); see supra note 335
and accompanying text.
381
See In re Crumpacker, 383 N.E.2d 36, 52 (Ind. 1978) (disbarring attorney based
on pattern of filing harassing litigation and making discourteous statements to opposing parties and lawyers); Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 523 (Iowa 1996) (disbarring attorney for filing frivolous
lawsuits and making false accusations of criminal conduct against other lawyers and
judges); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanai, 225 P.3d 203, 212 (Wash. 2009)
(disbarring attorney based on pattern of filing frivolous motions); see also In re Discip-
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commit fraud upon the court or similar misconduct.
Disbarment
for incivility is even less common, with public reprimands being more
383
typical. Although incivility might violate a disciplinary rule, it rarely
causes or risks serious injury—the outcome typically required under
the Standards before disbarment is appropriate in the case of a viola384
tion of a duty owed to one other than a client.
The approach would also work in other IIED cases involving
non-client claims. Many of the IIED cases stemming from a lawyer’s
attempt to collect a debt involve some type of dishonesty, harassment,
385
or misuse of the legal system. The Standards address these forms of
misconduct in various ways that can be applied by courts in a consis386
tent fashion. Particularly in the case of a lawyer who misuses the legal system, courts often emphasize the special policy concerns in387
volved when a lawyer engages in such action. Thus, in close cases,

linary Proceeding Against Sanai, 225 P.3d at 210 (Chambers, J., dissenting) (arguing in
favor of disbarment where lawyer’s conduct in litigation was described by trial judge
as “an indescribable abuse of legal process [involving] the most abusive and obstructive litigation tactics this Court has ever encountered”).
382
See Fla. Bar v. St. Louis, 967 So. 2d 108, 123 (Fla. 2007) (stating that the court
will typically disbar a lawyer who intentionally deceives the court); N.C. State Bar v.
Talford, 556 S.E.2d 344, 353 (N.C. 2001) (“The North Carolina State Bar has also
disbarred attorneys who demonstrated an intention to perpetrate a fraud upon the
court, subvert the trial process, or disrupt the court’s functioning.”); see also
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.11 (1986) (providing that
where a lawyer’s litigation-related misconduct involves fraud upon a court, disbarment is generally appropriate when the lawyer’s actions cause “serious or potentially
serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding”).
383
See In re Ramunno, 625 A.2d 248, 250 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (publicly reprimanding lawyer for use of profanity and insulting conduct toward opposing counsel); In re Goude, 374 S.E.2d 496, 497 (S.C. 1988) (publicly reprimanding lawyer for
engaging in discourteous behavior in court).
384
See Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, No. SC08-689, 2010 WL 2517995, at *5 n.3 (Fla. June 24,
2010) (reducing recommended sanction of disbarment to suspension due to lack of
evidence that respondent’s conduct caused serious or potentially serious harm).
385
See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
386
According to the Standards, disbarment is appropriate in cases of abuse of the
legal process where the lawyer intentionally misuses the legal process “to benefit the
lawyer or another when the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potentially serious injury to a party, or serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.”
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.2 cmt. (1986).
387
See, e.g., In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 322 n.1 (1st Cir. 1973) (“Lawyers have an
obligation as officers of the court not to indulge in any of these practices.”); Fla. Bar
v. Rightmyer, 616 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. 1993) (“We can conceive of no ethical violation more damaging to the legal profession and process than lying under oath . . . .
An officer of the court who knowingly and deliberately seeks to corrupt the legal
process can logically expect to be excluded from that process”).
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courts can draw upon such statements to help focus the inquiry as to
the extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct.
Threatening or initiating criminal prosecution in an attempt to
gain an advantage in a civil proceeding presents a slightly more complicated problem. In those jurisdictions where no disciplinary rule
prohibits this behavior, the jurisdiction has made clear that such be388
havior is within the permissible bounds of the practice of law.
Thus, a lawyer who takes such action in good faith should not be subject to IIED liability.
When, however, a jurisdiction has a disciplinary rule in place
prohibiting such conduct, or when the lawyer lacks a good faith belief
that criminal charges are warranted, discipline is appropriate. If a
lawyer’s threats or acts amount to criminal conduct involving “intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, [or] extortion,” disbarment would be appropriate under the Standards even absent any injury to the opposing
389
party.
Hence, such conduct should also be prima facie extreme
and outrageous. Similarly, threatening or initiating criminal proceedings without a good faith belief as to the charges has been found
to violate the disciplinary rule prohibiting conduct having no sub390
stantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden another.
This implicates a lawyer’s duty to the legal system as an officer of the
391
court and may amount to abuse of the legal process. Where serious
injury or potential injury (such as arrest or relinquishment of a legal
392
right) results, disbarment is appropriate; thus, such action should
393
also be considered extreme and outrageous.
Similarly, the Standards list the vulnerability of the victim as an aggravating factor in de394
termining the appropriate level of discipline. The fact that a lawyer
has threatened or initiated criminal prosecution against a former
388

See supra notes 288–92 (discussing ABA Ethics Opinion 92-363).
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 5.11(a) (1986).
390
See, e.g., La. State Bar Ass’n v. Harrington, 585 So. 2d 514, 520 (La. 1990); Robertson’s Case, 626 A.2d 397, 401 (N.H. 1993); Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op.
Comm.,
Ethics
Op.
No.
03-04,
¶
16
(2003),
available
at
http://www.utahbar.org/rules_ops_pols/ethics_opinions/op_03_04.html.
391
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 6.0 (1986).
392
Id. Standard 6.21.
393
Threatening or initiating criminal prosecution without a good faith belief that
charges are warranted may implicate a number of disciplinary rules. See supra note
290 and accompanying text. The Standards explain that a lawyer’s commission of
multiple offenses is an aggravating factor in the determination of the appropriate
sanction, thus possibly increasing the potential for disbarment. STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 9.22 (1986).
394
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS Standard 9.22 (1986).
389
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client—a person who may be particularly vulnerable to emotional distress given the special relationship of trust created by the attorney395
client relationship —may be considered an aggravating factor in the
outrageousness determination.
VI. CONCLUSION
By design, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
is reserved for the most egregious of misconduct, conduct that is
beyond all bounds of decency so as to be regarded as intolerable in a
civilized society. By design, disbarment is a sanction that is reserved
for the most egregious of lawyer misconduct, conduct that is utterly
intolerable within the legal profession. Realistically, courts will never
be able to adequately define the concept of extreme and outrageous
conduct for purposes of intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. Clearer standards are, however, within the courts’ reach in
some instances.
Given the crucial role lawyers, as public citizens, play in the administration of justice, conduct that warrants disbarment is conduct
that cannot be tolerated in a civilized society. By linking the standards for disbarment with the standard for extreme and outrageous
conduct, courts can provide courts and litigants with greater clarity as
to the permissible bounds of conduct. In the process, they may also
help promote public confidence that lawyers who engage in a wide
departure from the standards established to protect the public are ultimately held to the same standards as non-lawyers for purposes of
civil liability.

395

See People v. Rhodes, 107 P.3d 1177, 1183 (Colo. 2005) (noting “the vulnerability of any client who depends upon his / her attorney to act with integrity in their
affairs” and considering it an aggravating factor in imposing discipline). But courts
may be hesitant to assign much weight to this factor, due to the fact that “presumably
clients will usually be in a trust relationship with their attorneys.” In re Johnson, 826
P.2d 186, 193 (Wash. 1992).

